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The effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policies on the real variables targeted by 
qualified authorities has represented a major concern of central banks for decades. The 
normative importance of assessing the impact of monetary interventions has been the central 
topic of various streams of international literature, fostered by a number of historical events, 
which might have undermined the unambiguous effectiveness of the transmission mechanism. 
Since the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), empirical and theoretical 
research has been directed towards the estimation of cross-country differences in the reaction 
to centralized monetary stimuli. Many factors have been deemed responsible of nurturing 
heterogeneity, from individual-country structural ones to those involving inter-country 
dynamics and connection among them. The other historical event, described in this inquiry, 
that contributed to exacerbate the existing debate on the impact of monetary policy, is 
constituted by the dramatic financial crisis occurred in 2008. This extended period of distress 
and confusion impaired the traditional design and implementation of monetary policy, 
generating misleading signals about its impact on those variables which have been targeted 
for years by the central administration, thus fostering the already existing doubts on the 
effectiveness of its transmission mechanism. A revolution occurred in the way of planning 
and executing monetary policy interventions, no more centred on the leverage of interest rate 
to affect the behaviours of economic agents, but directly altering the balance sheet of credit 
institutions. For this reason, banks represent the exact core of this research work, which, 
starting from an aggregate perspective on the transmission mechanism, will tighten the focus 
on the credit channel, deemed to be the most relevant in relation to the research question. The 
objective of the work is to investigate the dynamics of the effectiveness of monetary measures 
for both standard and non-standard policies, so to provide normative insights targeted either at 
policy authorities or current researchers. To add a degree of sophistication, the exploration 
will be expanded in order to test whether the distributive cross-country homogeneity of the 
transmission mechanism has improved with the shift between the two categories of measures 
and investigate the path through which its determinants have been evolving. The methodology 
designed for this purpose is centred on a comparative overview of conventional and 
unconventional policies performed through an extensive literature scrutiny. After having 
largely explored the conventional versus unconventional policy dichotomy and the cross-
country heterogeneity issue on a theoretical ground, respectively in chapter 1 and chapter 2, 
the comparison of the two bank-lending channels will be performed throughout chapter 3, 















The transition from conventional to unconventional ECB monetary policies: effects on 




1.1 The traditional ECB monetary policy: an historical overview 
The aim of this first chapter of the inquiry is to shed some light on the leading types of 
monetary approaches which have been adopted by the ECB over time to affect the real 
economy, focusing on the shift of methodological approach that has been characterizing the 
most recent years. Such historical overview will prove to be helpful for a second subsequent 
step, intended to tackle more precisely the heterogeneous distributional effects of monetary 
policy across Euro countries, questioning the possibility that the above-mentioned transition 
has led to more homogeneous consequences.  
Monetary policy over years has mainly operated by employing a target value for the overnight 
interest rate in the interbank money market and adjusting the supply of central bank money 
according to that target through open market operations. In order to minimize the degree of 
risk exposure of the central bank’s balance sheet, all liquidity-providing operations have 
normally taken place in the form of reverse transactions against a menu of eligible collateral. 
In other words, in normal times the central bank shall neither be involved in direct lending to 
the private sector or the government, nor in outright purchases of government bonds, 
corporate debt or other types of debt instrument. Traditionally, by altering the extent of the 
key interest rates, the central bank effectively controls liquidity conditions in money markets 
and pursues its primary goal of granting price stability. This mechanism has proved to be a 
reliable source of monetary stimulus to the economy during downturns, helpful to contain 
inflationary pressures during upturns and ensure the sound functioning of money markets 
(Bini Smaghi, 2009).  
What distinguished central banks across countries was the approach chosen to pursue the 
targeted objectives, which has been evolving over time. Low and steady inflation has become, 
over time, the primary (or even unique) objective of monetary policy conducted by central 
banks in most industrialized countries. Contrary to this perspective, however, the US can be 
considered an exception in view of the so-called dual mandate of the Fed for “maximum 
employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates”. (Pattipeilohy, van den End, 
Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013). As a matter of facts, the Mundell-Fleming model ascertains 
that a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and national monetary policy cannot be achieved 
at the same time and, therefore, one of the mentioned variables has to be given up. The 
Bretton Woods regime allowed for capital controls even if, over time, the effectiveness of 
capital controls has gradually diminished. As a consequence, in a system characterized by a 
fixed exchange rate and free capital flows, money growth becomes endogenous. When 




and more attention to money growth variables, inspired by the monetarist adagio that inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. (Friedman, 1968) (Johnson, 1971) 
(Brunner & Meltzer, 1993). According to Benatti and Goodhart, this period came to be 
known, amongst central bankers and researchers, as “Practical Monetarism”, characterised by:  
• Trust in the medium/long term reliability of the relationship between monetary growth 
and nominal incomes/inflation; 
• Belief that velocity (demand for money) functions were foreseeable/stable enough to 
be considered as intermediate targets; 
• Conviction that interest rate elasticities allowed appropriate adjustments in both 
expenditure and other monetary aggregates; 
• Deep hostility towards monetary base control methods.  
In the US, such “monetarist experiment” started in October 1979, when the FOMC under 
Chairman Paul Volcker adopted an operating procedure based on the management of non-
borrowed reserves (Benati & Goodhart , 2010). This approach was aimed at controlling the 
growth of M1 and M2 and thereby at managing inflation. The disinflation effort was 
successful, creating room for the low-inflation regime that the United States has been 
enjoying since. It shall be said, however, that monetary and credit aggregates have no more 
played a central role in the formulation of U.S. monetary policy since that episode, although 
policymakers currently tend to use monetary data as a source of information about the state of 
the economy (Bernanke B. S., 2006).  
In Europe, the context was slightly different. The Bundesbank, committed to a unique 
mandate for price stability, introducing monetary targeting in 1974. Such strategy was 
commonly believed to be successful, even though the chosen goals were frequently missed. 
Although the formulation of new directions was deeply affected by the leading theories of 
monetarists, the implementation of such strategies in Germany deviated from the theoretical 
predictions in a number of ways. The first important difference with other geographical areas 
was that the target adopted by the Bundesbank was not considered in terms of monetary base, 
but according to a broadly defined monetary aggregate. Secondly, the Bundesbank avoided 
the direct control the money stock, following an indirect approach of affecting demand of 
money by modifying key money market rates and bank reserves (namely, a two-stage 
implementation procedure). Finally, the German central bank stated clearly from the 
beginning that it would have been committed to reach the monetary target with any degree of 
precision. Several other European decided, then, to peg their currency to the German Mark 




whose effects on the transmission mechanisms will be explored in the following chapter of 
the overall work. Since 1999, the Governing Council of the ECB has been entrusted of 
monetary policymaking in the euro area. The Maastricht Treaty definitely designed price 
stability as the ECB’s primary goal but delegated the Governing Council to give a precise 
meaning to this objective. The primary target, first set by the ECB as inflation less than 2 per 
cent in the euro area, was made even more precise in 2003, after internal evaluations of the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy, leading the ECB to clarify its aim for maintaining inflation 
“below but close to 2 per cent in the euro area in the medium term”. The ECB’s monetary 
policy is termed a “two-pillar” strategy that explicitly couples and links the discussion on 
monetary variables (monetary analysis) with a broad-based non-monetary analysis of the 
threats to price stability in the short to medium run (economic analysis) (Pattipeilohy, van den 
End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013).  
The two-pillar approach has specifically been designed to avoid the dispersion of relevant 
information during the assessment of the risks to price stability, as well as to secure that 
necessary consideration is given to different perspectives, warranting the cross-checking of 
data in order to reach an overall judgement on the risks to price stability. Such approach 
provides a natural cross-comparison of the indications coming from the shorter-term 
economic analysis with those from the longer term-oriented monetary analysis. This way, 
according to the ECB, ensures that monetary policy does not undervalue relevant information, 
which might prove to be helpful for assessing future inflation trends. The process of 
accounting for policy decisions and assessing their implications, not only based on short-term 
indications, stemming from the analysis of economic and financial conditions, but also on the 
basis of money and liquidity considerations, is thought to prevent ECB from being tempted to 
take an overly activist position in determining the monetary policy stance. (ECB, The 
Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2011). The above-mentioned monetary analysis’ focus is mainly 
centred on a medium to long-term horizon. When the ECB’s monetary policy strategy was 
first presented in 1998, the ECB Governing Council announced a quantitative reference value 
for the yearly growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate (M3). Currently, the monetary 
activity includes a more comprehensive analysis of the liquidity situation, going well beyond 
that M3 growth. 
Turning briefly to the broad international context, in contrast with the ECB, several central 
banks opted for inflation targeting, which was first implemented in 1989 by New Zealand as a 
monetary policy strategy. Since that moment, many other countries tent to target inflation as 




public announcement of quantitative targets for inflation, together with a strong commitment 
of the central bank to price stability as a main monetary objective, surrounded by a high 
degree of transparency and accountability (Mishkin & Savastano, 2001). The core aspect of 
this approach is a forward-looking decision-making process recognized as “inflation-forecast 
targeting”, concretely implying that the central bank sets its policy tools in such a way that its 
inflation forecast (after some time) equals the inflation target (Svensson, 1997). Although, in 
practice, different techniques of inflation targeting exist, they all share an announced 
numerical inflation goal and a predefined time horizon. The central bank’s forecast for 
inflation is therefore considered a key measure both when it comes to take decisions and in 
communicating them to the public (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 
2013). 
Irrespective of what their strategy is, most central banks tend to employ, alternatively or in 
concert, two policy instruments, namely policy interest rates and open market operations. The 
ECB provides two standing facilities, namely the marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility, both having an overnight maturity and available to banks on their own initiative. 
Banks can use these provided facilities if they necessitate liquidity or if they want to stall 
liquidity. The deposit facility is used for mopping up liquidity from the banks at rates which 
normally are substantially below market ones, whereas, on the other hand, the marginal 
lending facility furnishes liquidity to banks at proportions that are usually substantially above 
market rates. The ECB attempt to influence money market interest rates by rendering more (or 
less) liquidity to banks if it wants to decrease (increase) interest rates. To make it even 
simpler, it allocates that given amount of liquidity so to allow banks to fulfil their treasury 
needs at a price which is aligned with the ECB policy intentions. Liquidity in the money 
market is managed by steering short-term interest rates through open market operations, 
namely purchase and selling of financial assets. If such assets are bought from (or, 
alternatively, sold to) a bank, the reserves of that bank upon the central bank increase 
(decrease). The most recurrent open market operations of the ECB are the main refinancing 
operations (MROs) and longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), techniques which will 
be widely ongoing mentioned throughout chapter number one (see Table 1). Lending activity, 
by means of open market operations, is routinely conducted in the form of reverse 
transactions, whereby the central bank buys assets from a bank under a repurchase agreement 
(the bank commits to buy the asset back) or grants a loan against assets pledged as collateral. 
Reverse transactions are therefore considered transitory open market operations, implying the 
provision of funds for a limited, pre-specified period only. The ECB accepts instruments 




weekly, the ECB also regularly accomplish monthly LTROs with a number of maturities 
(either six or twelve months). Definitely, such techniques are directed at providing stability 
and continuity in liquidity terms to the banking sector (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, 
Frost, & de Haan, 2013). 
The final instrument discussed in the context of this paragraph involves minimum reserve 
requirements imposed on credit institutions. Under such scheme, banks are requested to hold 
compulsory deposits with NCBs. The volume of the required reserves is commensurate to the 
size and composition of the liability items on the balance sheet of the concerned institutions. 
The two main motives served by the minimum requirement systems are:  
• creating enough structural demand for central bank credit; 
• contributing to the consolidation of money market interest rates. 
 In other words, the minimum reserve system attempts to widen the structural liquidity 
shortage of the banking system. Self-reinforcing, banks’ desire to hold reserves with the 
NCBs makes the demand for central bank credit to increase, which, in turn, eases the 
conditions for the ECB to drive money market rates through regular liquidity-providing 
operations. Interest rates are thus normalized by allowing banks to use averaging provisions, 
that is, adhering to reserve requirements to the extent of average daily reserve holdings over 
the maintenance period. This mechanism allows the mitigation of liquidity fluctuations, since 
even temporary imbalances in reserves can be offset by opposite movements produced within 
the same maintenance period. (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013). 



















































Source: (ECB, 2011). 
To conclude the historical exploration of conventional policies, González-Páramo observed 
that the ECB’s Governing Council, practically, drew a clear demarcation line, within the 
monetary policy theoretical framework, between decisions and the implementation of such 
decisions. This “separation principle” entailed the Governing Council to decide separately 
upon the monetary stance (defining interest rate levels), while liquidity measures and open 
market operations were just instrumental to concretely implement this stance. This approach 
allowed the ECB to steer short-term interest rates close to the main policy rate, without 
risking that fine-tuning liquidity measures would have been sanctioned as modifications in the 
stance of monetary policy (González-Páramo, 2011).  
 
1.2 The impact of ECB conventional measures on the real economy and price level 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy has been and still currently is one of the 
most researched themes of monetary economics for at least two motives. First, acknowledging 
how monetary policy influences the real economy is crucial to assess its extent at a particular 
point in time. Second, in order to decide the configuration of policy instruments, policy 
makers shall evaluate precisely the timing and consequent implication of their policies in real 
terms. To perform this assessment, they shall understand accordingly the mechanisms through 
which monetary policy impacts key economic activity variables and inflation. Practitioners 
and researchers in monetary economics have continuously been formulating new thinking and 
theories on how monetary policy can actually affect the economy, improving the extent of the 
existing knowledge about the monetary transmission mechanism. Within this field of interest, 
the most recent updates suggest that there is a strong likelihood that deep modifications in the 
way monetary policy is transmitted in real and price level terms have occurred; such changes, 
which have been widely explored in the international bibliography over years, together with 
further developments of financial markets and new methodological approaches to monetary 
policy, are believed to be the major determining factors of that evolution (Boivin, Kiley, & 




Monetary policy is a vigorous tool, but one that sometimes has unexpected, uncertain or 
unwanted aftermaths. Monetary authorities, in the attempt of being successful in the 
implementation of monetary policy, must possess accurate evaluation expertise with regard to 
timing and effectiveness of their policies on the economy, thus requiring a deep understanding 
of the mechanisms through which different real variables might be affected by monetary 
stimuli. These transmission mechanisms include interest rate effects, exchange rate effects, 
other asset price effects and the so-called credit channel (Mishkin F. S., 1995). A relevant 
aspect of many of the mentioned transmission mechanisms has to be researched in the fact 
that the real (rather than the nominal) interest rate has an influence on other asset prices and 
spending over the remaining transmission channels. Furthermore, the whole expected path of 
interest rates, not solely the current value, influences asset prices and spending. Both of these 
features are in line with a crucial role of expectations in the outcomes of monetary policy 
actions, as implemented policies can affect both the expected course of nominal interest rates 
and the outlook for inflation, hence impacting real interest rates (Boivin, Kiley, & Mishkin, 
2011). As an implication, the real interest rate, better than the nominal rate, affects spending 
and offers important insights on how monetary policy can stimulate the economy, even if 
nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound, a notion that would prove to be helpful in 
further developments of ECB policies (Eggertsson & Woodford, 2003).  
The transmission of monetary policy through interest rate mechanisms has been a cornerstone 
of economics theory for over 50 years. It represents the key mechanism, central topic in the 
basic Keynesian literature, which has been a mainstay of teaching in macroeconomics. The 
traditional Keynesian perspective of how a monetary tightening impacts the real economy can 
be characterized by a schematic diagram, 
M ↓ => i ↑ => I ↓ => Y ↑. 
where M expresses a contractionary monetary policy leading to an increase in real interest 
rates (i), which in turn make the cost of capital to raise, consequently provoking a decline in 
investment spending (I), finally inducing a decline in aggregate demand and a fall in output 
(Y). Although Keynes originally pointed out that this channel mainly operated through 
businesses' decisions about investment expenditure, later research identified that consumers' 
decisions about housing and consumer durable spending can also be categorized as 
investment decisions. As a result, the interest rate channel of monetary transmission laid out 
in the above schematic equation equally refers to consumer spending, in which “I” stands for 




Considering the discussion on the exchange rate transmission mechanism, operating through 
impacts on net exports, beyond the purpose of this work, we can turn to the exploration of two 
additional transmission channel emphasized by monetarist theories. Over years, monetarist 
practitioners have affirmed the cruciality of evaluating how monetary policy affects the 
totality of relative asset prices and real wealth. The two theories linked to this perspective are 
expressed by the Tobin's q theory of investment and the hypothesis of wealth effects on 
consumption (Mishkin F. S., 1995). The former furnishes an explanation of how monetary 
policy works on the economy through its impact on the valuation of equities; the term q can 
be defined as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. If the value 
of q is high, firms’ market price is superior relative to the replacement cost of capital, and new 
plant and equipment capital are cheaper if compared to the market value of business firms. 
Companies would be then able to issue equity and obtain a higher price for it relative to the 
cost of the plant and equipment they are purchasing. Consequently, investment expenditure 
will increase, resulting from firms which can now afford to buy new investment goods with 
only a small issue of equity. On the other hand, when q is low, firms cannot afford to 
purchase new investment goods because the market value of firms is low compared to the cost 
of capital. If companies desire to acquire capital when q is low, they can buy another firm 
cheaply and acquire old capital instead. Investment spending will be low in this case. The 
main point of this theoretical argument refers to the existence a connection between Tobin's q 
and investment spending. But how actually can monetary policy affect equity prices? 
According to monetarists’ perspective, if money supply falls, the public finds itself to possess 
less money than it wishes and attempts to acquire it accordingly by reducing its spending. 
This generates repercussions on the stock market, decreasing the demand for equities and 
consequently lowering their prices. A more Keynesian story achieve a similar result as it 
interprets the rise in interest rates coming from contractionary monetary policy making bonds 
more attractive relative to equities, thereby forcing equities ‘price to fall. Merging these two 
perspectives with the fact that lower equity prices (Pe) bring to a lower q, and thus to lower 
investment spending (I), the following transmission mechanism schematic outline holds: 
M ↓ => Pe ↓ => q ↓ => I ↓ => Y↓ (Tobin, 1969). 
 
As an alternative to the model described above, a transmission channel, still operating with 
equity prices, occurs through wealth effects on consumption. This channel has been strongly 
defended by Franco Modigliani and, through his MIT-Penn-SSRC (MPS) model. He argued 




by human capital, real capital and financial wealth. A relevant element of financial wealth is 
common stocks. When stock prices decrease, the value of financial wealth fall accordingly, 
thus reducing the lifetime resources of consumers; all of this shall induce a fall in 
consumption. Since it has already been observed that contractionary monetary policy might 
lead to a decline in stock prices (Pe), another schematic transmission mechanism is here 
outlined: 
M ↓ => Pe ↓ => Wealth ↓ => Consumption ↓ => Y↓ (Modigliani, 1971). 
 
As pointed out in the famous paper by Bernanke and Gertler, well-known cornerstone of the 
international literature concerning the transmission of monetary policies, the widespread 
disappointment regarding the traditional theories about how interest rates movements explain 
the impact of monetary policy on expenditure on long-lived assets has brought to an 
innovative view, emphasizing how asymmetric information and costly enforcement of 
contracts creates agency problems in financial markets. The credit channel shall not be 
commonly thought as a distinct, free-standing alternative approach, opposed to the traditional 
monetary transmission mechanism, but rather as a set of factors that amplify and propagate 
conventional interest rate effects. For this reason, the term "credit channel" is something of a 
misnomer, as this apparatus, which is configurated more precisely as a reinforcing 
mechanism, shall not to be considered as a truly independent or parallel channel. As a matter 
of fact, this non-appropriate nomenclature has induced some scholars to explore the behaviour 
of credit aggregates, methodology which is likely to generate misleading results, as it will be 
detailed in the final chapter. According to the credit channel theory, the direct concrete 
implications of monetary policy on interest rates are magnified by endogenous changes in the 
external finance premium, which is the difference in cost between funds raised externally (by 
issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining earnings). The quantitative 
extent of the external finance premium is a proxy for malfunctions in the credit markets, 
which drive a wedge between the expected return expected by lenders and the costs faced by 
potential borrowers. According to the credit view, a modification in monetary policy based on 
open-market interest rates tends to stimulate the movement of the external finance premium in 
the same direction. Throughout this additional impact of policy on the external finance 
premium, the overall effect of monetary policy on the cost of borrowing broadly defined and, 
consequently, on real spending and real activity is amplified. Two consequent sub-channels of 
monetary transmission arise as a result of agency problems in credit markets: the bank lending 




idea that credit institutions play a key intermediary role in the financial system because of 
their suitability to deal with certain categories of borrowers, particularly with regard to small 
firms widely pronounced problems of asymmetric information. After all, powerful firms can 
directly access credit through stock and bond markets without necessity of going through 
banks. Thus, contractionary monetary policy that decreases bank reserves and bank deposits 
will have an influence by means of its effect on these borrowers. Simplified, the schematic 
procedure here is: 
M ↓ => bank deposits ↓ => bank loans ↓ => I ↓ => Y ↓ 
On the other hand, the balance-sheet channel works through the net worth of firms, implying 
that lenders in practise would find to have less collateral for their loans, so incurring in more 
probable and higher losses from adverse selection. A reduction in net worth, giving raise to 
adverse selection problems, leads to lower levels of lending towards finance investment 
spending. The lower extent of net worth of firms also creates moral hazard problems: owners 
would find themselves to possess a lower equity stake in their firms, strongly incentivizing 
them to undertake risky investment projects. Since the latter risky behaviour increases the 
likelihood that lenders will not be paid back, a fall in business firms' net worth generates a 
consequent reduction of lending and hence parallel investment spending decrease. In addition, 
monetary policies can affect firms' balance sheets in a number of ways, which will be under 
review across subsequent chapter of the dissertation. Austere monetary policy (M) generates a 
consequent lowering in equity prices (Pe) in accordance with the mechanism described 
before, reducing the net worth of firms and so bringing to decreased investment expenditure 
(I) and aggregate demand (Y), due to the adverse selection and moral hazard agency 
problems. The balance-sheet channel mechanism is schematically described by the following 
relation: 
M↓ => Pe ↓ => adverse selection and moral hazard ↑ => lending ↓ => I ↓ => Y↓ 
The balance-sheet channel furtherly furnishes a justification for the emphasis on asset price 
effects highlighted by monetarist theorists. Contractionary monetary policy that raises interest 
rates also impairs firm's balance sheets because of its deteriorating effect on cash flow. This 
mechanism drives to the to the following additional schematic procedure for the balance-sheet 
channel:  
M↓ => i ↑ => cash flow ↓ => adverse selection and moral hazard ↑ => lending ↓ => I ↓ => Y↓ 
Notwithstanding with the majority of scholars, stating that the credit channel shall mainly 




as well to consumer spending. Accordingly, deteriorations in bank lending generated by a 
monetary contraction should drive a decline in durables and housing purchases by consumers, 
whose access to other sources of credit is limited. Likewise, interest rate expansions produce 
sorts of worsening in household balance sheets, impacting their cash flow, which results to be 
adversely affected. (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). 
An alternative approach for verifying how the balance-sheet channel may be transmitted to 
through consumers resides in the liquidity effects impacting consumer spending, both durable 
goods and housing components. According to such view, balance-sheet effects operate 
through their implications on consumers' inclination to spend rather than on lenders' desire to 
lend. In this model, consumers expecting a higher probability of finding themselves in 
financial distress would rather be holding fewer illiquid assets like consumer durables or 
housing and would strive for holding more liquid financial assets. The underlying rationale 
here is that, if consumers were requires to sell their durables or housing to raise money, they 
would then expect to suffer large losses, because the impossibility to obtain the full value in a 
distress sale. In contrast, current assets like liquidities held in bank, stocks or bonds can, more 
straightforwardly, be realized at full market value to raise cash. This mechanism explains a 
further monetary policy transmission, based on the link between money and equity prices. 
When deteriorating stock prices reduce the value of financial assets, consumer spending on 
housing or durable goods will decrease accordingly, because of their less secure financial 
position and the higher expected likelihood of suffering from financial distress. Explained 
here in a clear-cut schematic form: 
M ↓ => Pe ↓ => financial assets ↓ => likelihood of financial distress ↑ => consumer durable 
and housing expenditure ↓ => Y ↓. 
The illiquid nature of such goods provides an additional motivation for why a contractionary 
policy, raising interest rates and thus reducing cash flow to consumers, makes durable goods 
and housing expenditure to deteriorate. To sum up, the weakening in consumer cash flow 
boosts the expected probability of financial distress, which in turn negatively affects 
consumers’ durable goods or housing holding, finally incentivizing spending reduction on 
such goods and thereby causing a fall in aggregate output (Mishkin F. S., 1978).  
As a conclusive remark, aimed at better categorizing the studied phenomenon, monetary 
policy transmission schemes broadly fall into two basic categories: neoclassical channels, 
which imply financial markets to be perfect, based on the core models of investment, 
consumption, and international trade behavior theorized during the mid-twentieth century, and 




usually referred to as beloning to the above described credit view. Table 2 summarizes the 
theoretical concepts behind such distinctions, providing a final recap of the paragraph. 




Interest rate/ cost-of-capital/ Tobin’s q 
Changes in short-term policy rates affect the user 





Changes in short-term interest rates affect 
discounted present values and/or Tobin’s q for 
various types of assets, and these changes in the 




Changes in short-term interest rates affect the slope 
of the consumption profile 
 
Exchange rate effects 
Changes in short-run policy interest rates induce 
changes in the exchange rate through unconvered-
interest parity and/or portfolio balance effects 
Non-neoclassical channels 
 
Regulation-induced credit effects 
Restrictions on financial institutions (e.g. deposit 
rate ceilings, credit restrictions…) affect spending  
 
Bank-based channels 
Banks play a special role addressing problems of 
asymmetric information. Thus, decrease in bank 
lending capacity impact expenditure 
 
Balance sheet channel 
Changes in net worth associated with the asset price 
effects of monetary actions influence external 
finance premia facing firms and households 
  






1.3 The Great Recession: introducing the major discontinuity point for monetary policy 
The period started with the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 has created a new set of 
complex and ever-seen challenges to confront with for central banks around the world. The 
early stages of the crisis were characterized by dangers for liquidity and solvency conditions 
of the most well-known financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 
the US and Northern Rock, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and Halifax Bank of Scotland in the 
UK. These threats caused a strict impairment of the regular functioning of financial markets. 
As market players were forced to review their considerations about creditworthiness of 
financial institutions, together with their willingness to fund the banking sector only at a 
higher price, if at all. Consequently, substantial credit differentials, wedges between short-
term central bank policy rates and the rates facing households and firms, occurred 
dangerously. This clenching of credit availability and condition has been a characterizing 
aspect of the period to which scholars now refer to as the ‘Great Recession’, namely a severe  
deterioration of economic activity throughout the major economies, unique not only by 
historical standards but also protracted and followed by a sluggish and as yet incomplete 
recovery (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). Many possible motivations for such an unexpectedly 
stagnant restoring from the Great Recession have been argued over years, all implying 
undervaluation persistently negative impact of the crisis.  
Drawing from these considerations, a particularly striking assumption involves the 
impairment of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through times of crisis, which 
renders monetary policy attempts less effective in achieving output and inflation goals, if 
compared with non-crisis ages (Bouis, Rawdanowicz, Renne, Watanabe, & Christensen , 
2013). Financial crises’ main features are represented by a sever degree of financial market 
distress, relevant balance-sheet alterations of financial institutions, private households and 
firms, an extremely uncertain context which negatively affects firms’ and consumers’ levels of 
confidence (Reinhart & Rogoff , 2008) (Bloom, 2009) (Dées & Brinca, 2013). All of these 
characteristics are potentially harmful for the transmission of monetary policy on the real 
economy (Bouis, Rawdanowicz, Renne, Watanabe, & Christensen , 2013) (Bloom, 2014). 
Nonetheless, possible amplified consequences of monetary policy during financial crises can 
occur, in case central banks attempt to mitigate some of the adverse characteristics which are 
typical of distress periods, and eventually discourage dangerous feedback loops between the 
financial sector and the real economy (Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist, 1999) (Mishkin F., 
2009). Monetary policy during financial turmoil is therefore extremely ambiguous, its 




transmission to the real economy. As a relevant example, in the context financial market 
distress, a context of deep uncertainty characterizes the initial and most acute stage of a 
financial crisis, when recession typically emerges to further complicate the issue. Balance-
sheet modifications may be relevant in the succeeding phase of the crisis, when financial 
market torment and instabilities relax, and the economy begins its hard path to recovery 
(Jannsen, Potjagailo , & Wolters , 2015).  
The contested hypothesis, which matters for purposes of policy conduction, of monetary 
approaches effectiveness during financial turmoil is, for practical reasons, a great concern for 
policy makers. If they are thought to be successful, monetary expansions can be used as an 
important instrument to ease the unfavourable consequences crises on the real economy. On 
the other hand, if monetary policy transmission, as it seems to be according to recent research, 
is impaired during financial meltdowns, focus on political interventions may be necessary to 
achieve a substantial stabilization result, which, in turn, can potentially foster the unintended 
costs of excessive expansionary policy, namely disproportionate risk-taking, possible risks of 
asset price bubbles and systemic financial risks (Rajan, 2005) (Altunbasa, Gambacorta, & 
Marques-Ibanez, 2014) (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydrò, & Saurina, 2014). From the purely 
academic point of view, a discrete amount of formerly research results suggest that standard 
monetary policy is less powerful during financial crises as the traditional transmission 
channels, described in the previous paragraph, are proved to be flawed. 
1. First, the credit channel results to be profoundly impaired. Financial institutions, more 
than many other players in the economy, face considerable losses from credit defaults 
as well as relevant difficulties in  the procurement of new funding, causing them to 
adjust, manipulate their balance-sheets (Bouis, Rawdanowicz, Renne, Watanabe, & 
Christensen , 2013). The concrete chance of additional credit defaults boosts due to 
high vagueness, correspondingly reducing the availability of credit institutes to furnish 
bank lending (Valencia, 2013) (Buch, Buchholz, & Tonzer, 2014). In this confuse 
framework, adjustments to monetary policy are likely to become much less relevant 
for the determination of credit aggregates compared to stable times;  
2. Secondly, even the standard interest rate channel risks to be seriously damaged. Firms 
and individuals tendentially defer investment choices in periods of such high 
uncertainty. If investments are partially irreversible, investors tend to take time and 
postpone investment decisions until more fine-grained data are available and their 
apprehension is, at least, partially evaporated (Bernanke B. S., 1983) (Dixit & Pindyck 




that may eventually weakend during times in which both firms and consumers have 
very low levels of confidence towards business or employment future (Morgan, 1993). 
Moreover, it may become even more complicated for central banks to stabilize output 
in times of high macroeconomic volatility, when firms are used to adjust prices 
regularly. As a result, monetary magnifications are more likely to generate inflation 
rather than output growth (Vavra, 2014).  
In contrast to such view, other practictioners have been arguing that monetary policy could be 
more successuful in pursuing its objectives during financial turmoil. An evidence of this 
perspective is represented by a central bank, able to ease the damaging effects of a financial 
crisis, thereby reestablishing the regular functioning of the credit and interest rate channels. In 
this particular case, firms and private households are more likely to experience credit 
contraints during turbolent periods, due to a sudden fall in the value of their financial 
properties and collaterals, which could be lost. In this concerning eventuality, monetary policy 
might prove to be efficient in reducing the external finance premium by relieving these 
constraints through the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995) 
(Bernanke, Gertler , & Gilchrist, 1999). Monetary policy, going through periods of turmoil, 
might finally play a crucial role in raising confidence up from extremely low levels, directly 
providing signals about future positive economic prospects (Barsky & Sims, 2012) or 
indirectly by reducing the likelihood of worst-case outcomes, as well as by conditioning the 
willingness of agents to make probability assessments about future events (Ilut & Schneider, 
2014).  
Before the cornerstone represented by the Great Recession, standard monetary policy across 
the globe was defined exclusively in the traditional terms of a short-term interest rate. As 
extensively described in the preceding paragraph, policymakers used to commit to a given 
level of interest rate, while the the monitoring of liquidity conditions was based on granting 
that a market “reference rate”, namely an overnight rate, closely traced the desired interest 
rate level. The central bank used to hold total monopolistic control over bank reserves, 
implying the power to set the amount and the extent to which reserves had to be supplied at 
the margin. Therefore, the central bank has always been able to determine the opportunity 
cost, or price, of reserves, namely the overnight rate, fixing it to the level it deemed necessary 
for policy purposes. As a relevant discontinuity point with future policy developments, 
standard policies could be sustained without substantial modifications to the size of the 
central bank’s balance sheet; such adjustments were traditionally caused by exogenous 




reserve requirements (Borio & Disyatat, 2010). With the advent of the first turbolences, 
generated by financial instabilities, this conventional approach to monetary policy had largely 
lost its effectiveness. As a first response, central banks attempted to stir broader financial 
conditions more actively, extensively adjusting their balance sheet to that purpose. These 
operations generally resulted in considerable alterations in the size and composition of the 
central bank’s assets and liabilities. (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 
2013).  
Several authors over years have been trying to distinguish some categories within 
unconventional measures of monetary policy and, theoretically, a distinction can be made 
between quantitative and qualitative easing. The first implies a widening of the central bank 
balance sheet which does not touch the configuration of its asset. This way, the mix of assets 
possessed by the central bank remains unaltered: the share of each asset category in total 
holdings not experience substantial changes, nor new asset items are added to the balance 
sheet. The reason of the consequent increase in the monetary base has to be researched in the 
accumulation reserves by the central bank. Differently, under qualitative easing, the overall 
magnitude of the central bank balance sheet is left untouched, but here the composition of 
asset holdings is changed. The very first nonconventional policies initially applied were 
mainly represente by forms of qualitative easing until the collapse of Lehman, cornerstone 
event, after which central bank balance sheets started to be adjusted (even as the composition 
of the asset side continued to evolve accordingly), resulting in a commistion of both 
quantitative and qualitative easing (Lenza, Reichlin, & Pill, 2010).  
During the infancy of the financial crisis, ECB’s first moves did not involve the reduction of 
its policy rates. But in the aftermath of the demise of Lehman Brothers, its key interest rates 
have been pushed down to historically low levels. The main refinancing rate was cut by a total 
of 325 basis points to 1 per cent between October 2008 and May 2009. In addition, the 
Governing Council adopted a first set temporary nonstandard measures, subsequently termed 
under the umbrella of “Enhanced Credit Support”, turning most of the attention to credit 
institutions. The interbank market suffered from malfuctioning due to solvency concerns 
relative to other banks. The Enhanced Credit Support is said to be built upon five main 
blocks:  
1. Unlimited liquidity allocation through “fixed rate tenders with full allotment”, 
concerning both the main refinancing operations (MROs) and the long-term 




gained unlimited access to central bank liquidity at the main refinancing rate, if an 
adequate collateral could be established; 
2. Enlargement of the (already long) list of collateral options, in order to make the share 
of private sector assets to increas to 56 per cent of the nominal value of securities on 
the list; 
3. Extension of the maturity terms relative to LTROs, initially to six months, and then, in 
late June 2009, to twelve months, intenting to improve the conditions for commercial 
banks’ liquidity planning process; 
4. Enhancement of liquidity provision in foreign currencies, particularly U.S. dollars, 
through swap lines with the Federal Reserve. This measure aimed at supporting banks 
which would have otherwise faced a massive shortfall in US dollar funding during the 
financial crisis; 
5. Actuation of Covered Bonds Purchase Programmes (CBPPs), whose market had 
virtually dried up in terms of liquidity, issuance and spreads. The aim of the program 
was to revive the covered bond market, which is a very important financial market in 
Europe and a primary source of financing for banks. 
A short historical summary of the followed steps is now given. On 10 May 2010 the ECB 
decided to launch the Securities Market Programme (SMP), in order to address the severe 
tensions in certain market segments. This reflected an attempt of granting an effective 
functioning of the secondary market of some euro area government bonds in order to foster 
better liquidity conditions and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. After a first approach to such kind of interventions, the program was re-activated 
in August 2011, in response to renewed tensions. It was common belief that failing to pay 
appropriate consideration to these severe market tensions, would have created unbearable 
downside risks to price stability (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013). 
ECB policy-makers highlighted in more than an occasion that the concrete finality of the SMP 
was not to alter the monetary policy stance, whose key drivers were represented by the key 
policy rates (Manganelli, 2012). In November and December 2011, as a reinforcing tool, the 
ECB introduced liquidity-enhancing measures aimed at consolidation the liquidity position of 
European banks. Finally, on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the ECB announced its 
intention to perform Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary sovereign bond 
markets, an extreme attempt directed towards an appropriate protection of the transmission 
mechanism and the uniqueness of the monetary policy. A key pre-requisite for OMTs is strict 
and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability 




form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary 
programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of 
EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The focus was on the shorter end of the yield curve, 
and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. 
Importantly, no ex ante quantitative limits were set on the size of OMTs. (Pattipeilohy, van 
den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013). A graphic historical narration of the crisis, 
illustrating the path of the MRO and of the ECB balance sheet, will be shown below, in order 
to provide some stylized facts on the dramatic entity of what occurred.  
Figure 1: Eurosystem balance sheet and Main Refinancing Operations Rate trends 
 
Source: (Dominguez-Torres & Hierro, 2020) 
A further distinction, which arises from the international literature, is drawn refering to 
conventional and unconventional attributes even in the field of non-conventional monetary 
measures. A wide description of such conventional forms of non-standard measure has 
already been given throughout this second paragraph, a brief mention to their counterparties is 
here, for reasons of completeness, given. Central banks have resorted to occasional use of a 
range of policy tools including forward guidance with regard to short-term interest rates, 
credit easing schemes and long-term liquidity operations. These measures, respectively aimed 
at providing relevant information about the future expected path of policy and measures 
designed to improve conditions in the banking sector (ranging from the extended provision of 
short-term liquidity, to longer-term schemes that provide funding to banks in order to ease 
credit conditions), enhancing liquidity policies (although these are primarily extensions of 
central banks’ LOLR functions, rather than monetary policy per se, they have also been 
deployed to provide funding to banks on a longerterm basis), and reducing funding costs in 




credit conditions by providing funding to lenders), can be broadly aggregated under the frame 
of unconventional non-standard policies (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). 
 
1.4 Transmission consequences of unconventional measures 
A great deal of in-depth research has been conducted over years about the transmission of  
conventional measures; on the other hand, few trustworthy insights are known about the pass-
through effectivenss relative to monetary measures aimed at expandind central bank balance 
sheets for a given policy rate, even if the extent of the international literature on the 
mentioned topic has became more consistent since few years. A sound comprehension of the 
transmission mechanism and the macroeconomic impact of such policies is not only crucial 
for policymakers, in order to improve their efficiency, it is also fundamental for the 
reinforcement of conceptual monetary schemes for the analysis of unconventional monetary 
policy and the financial turmoil, which could eventually prove to be helpful in the future, 
given the possibility of other turbolent times (Boeckx, Dossche, & Peersman, 2017). 
What this paragraph aims at analysing, first through a comprehensive lens and then one by 
one specifically, the channels through which QE is thought to impact the expenditure and 
income aggregates in the economy. To shed some light on the nomenclature, the three 
channels through which QE might affect asset prices are: portfolio rebalancing, signalling, 
and liquidity. A schematic representation of the trasmission channels relative to quantitative 
easing policies is given in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Stylized representation of QE trasmission channels. 
 
Source: (Joyce, McLaren, & Young, 2012). 
To begin, in accordance with central bank communication issues, a stress on the portfolio 




non-bank private sector, mentioned in the anterior paragraph, is explored, further arguing 
which factors may influence its success. The concern about how asset purchases may operate 
as signallers for future policy intentions, thereby reducing liquidity premia, is then discussed. 
The investigation proceeds analysing the extent to which an adjustments of asset prices may  
be transmitted to to nominal spending, underlining both cost-of-capital and wealth effects. 
Moreover, some of the distributional concerns generated by QE, such as the differential 
effects faced by small and large firms, and by households with different levels of financial 
wealth, including pensioners, are subsequently tackled. Finally, some helpful hints, coming 
from both monetarist and New Keynesian theory, which have proved their concrete 
insightfulness for a complete understanding of QE are presented: a monetarist approach 
actually provides an alternative, but complementary, conceptual approach about the pass-
through of QE (as well as helpful insights into the role of bank reserves and bank lending), 
whereas New Keynesian theory, inspired to Eggertsson and Woodford’s work (Eggertsson & 
Woodford, 2003), implies the starkly different result that QE is always and everywhere 
ineffective. (Bowdler & Radia, 2012).  
As previously  discussed, the most common approach for implementation of QE policies has 
involved the creation of broad money through the purchase of government bonds from 
investors such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds, in order to directly inject 
liquidity into the economy. A change in asset prices is the main real result of such 
intervention, which can be intended as the first step of the transmission mechanism of QE.  
The first channel through which QE is thought to impact asset prices is through the portfolio 
rebalancing that it may encourage. Through the acquisition of assets from the private sector, 
the central bank attempts to inferfer with the portfolios of the sellers of gilts. At a first glance, 
the non-bank private sector (to which for example a pension fund might belong) is left 
retaining money in the form of bank deposits rather than gilts (Bean, 2011) (Dale, 2010). 
Let’s now turn to the effects generated on the balance sheets relative to the private sector, and 
therefore on portfolios,  which may trigger a string of adjustments in asset prices. Two 
alternatives here shall be distinguished. If the private sector is indifferent between keeping 
gilts and money, meaning that they are perceived as perfect substitutes, then the process 
closes there. Concretely, irrespective of the intervention from competent authorities, 
portfolios remain perfecly balanced. At the zero lower bound, money and short-term bonds 
can both deemed assets, with no matured interests and insignificant credit risk. Consequently, 
the private sector absorbs the amount of money which have been created throuh that 




a null impact: the economy is experiencing the so called liquidity trap. Woodford (2012) 
named such type of transactions as “pure QE”, because of its attention on the quantity of 
money attemped to be injected into the economy (Woodford, 2012). Contrasting with this 
concept, traditional QE shall be conducted focusing just on assets other than short-dated gilts. 
The rationale behind such distinction is that other assets are likely to resemble that relation of 
perfect substitutability. In the eventuality that the two elements are imperfect substitutes, then 
adjustements in relative holdings of the two will induce portfolio rebalancing and movements 
in asset prices (Tobin, 1969) (Brunner & Meltzer, 1972).   
A second path to explain the impact on asset prices through asset purchases has to do with 
alterations of the overall extent of interest rate risk in bond markets. The value of fixed 
income assets, such as government bonds, are connected to expected movements in interest 
rates, whose extent is termed duration. In the eventuality of investors risk-aversion, they will 
require a term premium as a compensation for bearing that risk. The purchase of long-term 
assets by the central banks negatively relates to the aggregate amount of duration risk still 
existing in the market. Consistently, a reduction of the incentives required by investors as 
collaterls to hold all remaining bonds carrying duration risk is detected, generating downward 
pressure on longer-term real interest rates (Sack, 2011). Investors will seek to re-invest the 
money they hold aiming at rebalancing their portfolio, in search of alternatives to government 
bonds whose price is substantially higher. Individuals will naturally attempt to purchase 
slightly more risky assets, which had turned to be relatively cheaper compared to domestic 
government bonds, either in the form of high-quality corporate bonds, foreign government 
bonds, or blue-chip equities. Such assets are sold by individuals seeking to restore the 
balancing of their portfolios by holding increase proportions of riskier assets. The process just 
described is an iterative one, going on as long as all asset prices have been adjusted in the way 
that investors, in aggregate, are willing to hold the entirely assets supply. Several elements are 
connected to the effectiveness of any portfolio rebalancing channel: once the relevance of 
imperfect substitutability is accounted for, the success of portfolio rebalancing approaches 
will be dependent upon the degree of substitutability between assets. The likelihood of 
effectiveness will be the greater the lower the substitutability relationship between money and 
gilts (or whichever other assets the central bank purchases) and the higher the same 
correlation for risky assets and gilts. As a matter of fact, the lack of risk appetite may be a 
proxy for limited investors’ desired exposure to risky assets. The extremely modest values on 
government debt that have been detected in many advanced economies as a consequence of 
turmoil may be a result of the tendency of investors to attach a safety premium to low-risk, 




The third channel influencing long-term interest rates via asset purchases operates mainly 
through disclosure of relevant information about the expected trend of future monetary policy 
(Bowdler & Radia, 2012). This way of affecting economy shares some appicative similarities 
with conventional policies: in the same manner, the communication of unconventional 
measures is an integral part of their transmission mechanism (Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, 
de Haan , & Jansen, 2008). Central banks, are committed to announce many details about 
their undertaken operations. This behaviour is intended to affect public expectations about key 
factors underlying asset’s market valuation, such as expectations regarding the future policy 
path or their risk and liquidity profiles. Also the disclosure about the central bank 
management of operations involving illiquid assets is itself a source of investors’ confidence 
booming with regard to those assets, which in turn decreases liquidity premia. As a relevant  
practical example, considering the euro area, announcements from the ECB might actually 
condition market understanding of tail risks, what really happened to market reactions to the 
declaration of the OMTs. If policy approaches are correctly anticipated from the public, 
investors will assign them a value even before the policy details are announced. The key 
elements which makes policy announcements effective is represented by the surprise which is 
delivered to the market (Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013).The 
monetary policy authority may seek to furtherly loosen monetary policy through signalling 
the expectation about policy rates to remain low for a longer period. This strategy shall be 
coupled with undertaking asset purchases, a way for central banks to show the commitment to 
their goals and confidence in pursuing them at the zero lower bound. This may be serving the 
central bank to keep a trustworthy image of itself while keeping inflation expectations 
anchored (Bowdler & Radia, 2012).  
A fourth channel, operating through liquidity, might serve in periods of high financial market 
stress. Whenever such markets are imperfect, individuals may seek to demand higher returns 
on assets to counterbalance for the risk that there may not be clients willing to pay for an asset 
should they deem necessary to sell it. By boosting the amount of trading, and consequently 
the degree of  liquidity of financial markets, asset purchases operated by the central bank may 
reduce liquidity premia. These real consequences likely occurs only throughout times of asset 
purchases, and their extent is likely to seem lower in gilt markets, traditionally characterized 
by high liquidity (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). In case such actions generated a central bank 
liquidity surplus, a differential among the key policy rate (namely the MRO rate in the ECB 
context) and the overnight market rate (EONIA) would originate from unconventional 
measures. Moreover, the pricing procedure relative to relevant financial instruments may be 




as EURIBOR or LIBOR, namely basic rates for many private credit agreememts) can be 
reduced for a given level of policy rates, indirectly incentivizing private expenditure 
(Pattipeilohy, van den End, Tabbae, Frost, & de Haan, 2013). 
The way and extent to which asset transactions, and in particular purchases, can affect their 
relative prices is a a typical empirical hypothesis which have been widely researched and 
tested in recent years. The dominant view revolves around explicit evidence of generalized 
decline in government bond values resulting from asset purchase campaigns. Corporate bond 
yields have also been demonstrated to fall, parallelly to increases in equity prices. However, 
the debate on the existence of persistent disagreement about the amount and duration of such 
mechanism is still a central topic, as some technical obstacles, like extrication of the different 
channels through which these effects may arise, seems to be irremovable (Joyce, McLaren, & 
Young, 2012) (Breedon, Chadha, & Waters, 2012) (Martin & Milas, 2012).  
Time to focus on the following transmission step of the whole mechanism, that between asset 
prices and spending. In particular, hightened asset prices shall give a positive stimulus to 
private expenditure through a reduction in the cost of capital and an increase in wealth. A 
certain degree of heterogeneity has been detected across different sectors; consequently, QE 
may result in a distributive issue affecting the whole economy. Finally, some wealth effects 
potentially arising from a generalized boom in asset prices are reported, and again some of the 
distributional consequences of these effects are emphasized (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). 
The cost at which economic agents usually access credit is typically related to the riskfree 
rates at the maturity that they attempt to borrow. Thus, similarly to what happens with 
conventional measures, a reduction in the yield curve is thought to shift into a fall in the 
interest rates faced by households and firms. Assuming that banks gain from hightened values 
of asset likewise non-financial corporations do, then their cost of debt issuance will decrease 
accordingly. All these factors, combined with a fall in funding costs, will empower banks to 
reduce the price of loans. The just-described mechanism shall lead to boost both consumption 
and investment respectively through improved stimuli to borrow and worsened incentives 
to save (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). In accordance to such impairement of credit channels, 
central banks have concentrate their communication efforts on the ways in which QE can 
affect the cost of capital without the necessity to influence also the banking sector. With 
reference to the specific channels, portfolio rebalancing techniques towards corporate bonds 
negatively impact borrowing costs for those companies in close contact with capital markets. 
However, traditionally, privates and small firms are not equipped with an easy access to 




Nevertheless, additional potential feasible transmission channels to small firms exist. First, 
supply-chain effects may arise, particularly in those sectors charactetized by deep 
relationships between small firms and large firms. The former will enjoy the advantages of  an 
increased demand or improved trade credit. A second advantage for small businesses has to be 
researched in inceased competitiveness in the export sector thanks to a deprecitation of the 
domestic currency. As a relevant constraint, the eventuality for the banking sector to remain 
damaged for other reasons, perhaps connected to financial institutions capital limitations, still 
endures: in that case, modifications in the cost of issuing debt may have little effect on the 
price of credit for potential borrowers. The latter mechanism has been concretely deployed by 
central banks in order to produce a more effective stimulus to lending in response to structural 
defects of the banking sector (Bowdler & Radia, 2012).  
The explored expansions in asset prices shall also stand for improvements in net wealth for 
their holders. These capital gains are thouht to promote aggregate expenditure by households 
and firms (which are ultimately owned by households). The major share of such benefits shall 
be collected by those holding the greatest amount of financial assets, in particular older and 
more whealty households. Similarly and parallelly, significant proportions of gross household 
financial assets are owned in the forms of pensions (Joyce , Tong, & Woods, 2011).  
A monetarist viewpoint of QE is finally displayed, providing an alternative, complementary 
approach for sheding light on the transmission mechanism, and also explaining some common 
conceptual divergencies about the functioning of QE (Bowdler & Radia, 2012). QE can be 
thouht as well as a shock to money supply, and its transmission mechanism would therefore 
be explained according to major analysis. Turning back to Figure 1 , QE induces a positive 
shock of money supply through boosting holdings of the non-bank private sector, in terms of 
deposits. The nonbank private sector would only be eager to accept this hightened supply of 
money, once at least one of  the elements of money demand has changed. Briefly recapping, 
money demand is considered either a means for easing transactions (“medium of exchange” 
function) or a financial asset (“store of value” function). Consequently the demand for money, 
according to major research, is contingent on three elements: the value of transactions in the 
economy or nominal spending; the overall value of asset portfolios; and the relative rate of 
return on money as compared to other assets. One of these factors must be therefore altered, 
according to a central bank asset purchase campaing. An interesting way though which this 
rebalancement occurs, takes place via the familiar, already examined, process of portfolio 
rebalancing. The sellers of gilts pass around the money among themselves, thus restoring their 




hold a major stock of deposits. This mechanism represents a complementary monetarist 
alternative to portfolio rebalancing (Bridges & Thomas, 2012). Some relevant implications of 
this conceptual argument are: first, the multiplier relative to the transmission from QE to 
broad money is more likely to be approximable to a unit rather than a much larger multiple 
based on historical averages (Goodhart & Ashworth, 2012); second, the particular attitude of 
reserves held by credit institutions seems not to play an important role in the transmission 
mechanism of QE (Bean , Paustian, Penleaver, & Taylor, 2010).  
To conclude, a brief exploration of the motives generating the presumed research vagueness 
about the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies is provided.  
1. A first issue has to be researched in the simultaneous announcements of policy 
undertaking attempts by central banks and fiscal authorities in many countries, which 
generated complexities in disentangling the individualized effects of unconventional 
measures; 
2. A second relevant issue impacting the success of non-standard policies has to be 
researched in regulatory changes. Briefly, the response of financial markets to these 
policy initiatives may have evolved over years. For instance, while fiscal stimuli were 
initally perceived as stabilizing forces, such concerns about sovereign indebtedness 
evolved from the previous perspective as long as the crisis started its disruptive 
expansion; 
3. Third, further assessment complications may arise because of potentially long and 
variable policy lags. To be more clear, the implications of unconventional measures 
are though to be more immediate during crisis, because of the complementary effect of 
the expectation channel in addition to the standard channels of transmission; 
4. Fourth, the continuity characterizing feature of the crisis is likely to impair the 
effectiveness of any assessement about the evolution of economic and financial 
conditions which would have occur in absence of a policy response;  
5. Fifth and finally, the implications of a particular policy initiative targeted towards a 
specific issue may not be limited to the intended economic impact, as a discrete 
likelihood of spillover effects across markets exists. If policies of one country may 
spill over to other countries, geographical heterogeneity in the trasmission mechanism 
might be a crucial issue to be tackled for improving the effectiveness of policy makers 
(the just-described topic will represent one argument of the discussion about cross-
country heterogeneity, which will be throughout the following chapters) (Kozicki, 




1.5. Conventional or unconventional: different transmission mechanisms 
The aftermath of the financial turmoil has been marked by the implementation from the ECB 
of a variety of unconventional measures, which have been commented throughout the two 
preceding paragraphs. The relevance, as well as the success, of individual ECB tools of 
monetary policy, and their transmission, has been constantly maturing over years. Evidence 
from the wide international literature indicates that each of the multiple stages of QE has had 
very different impacts and the overall policy has not always generated stock market surges, 
massive capital inflows or alterations in domestic exchange rates, as probably expected. The 
heterogeneous impact across countries depends significantly on the type of policy pursued, 
and even more on the degree of advancement of financial markets (Kucharcuková, Claeys, & 
Vasícek, 2016). 
A brief review of the extensive research background, comparing evidences from conventional 
and unconventional policies will be now presented, postponing the discussion on the 
relevance of such comparison for the scope of this work to the conclusive chapter. Lenza et al. 
(2010) supported the idea that, despite the evident differences in the execution, the concrete 
consequence of the unconventional measures implemented by the ECB (the evidence involved 
also both the Fed and the BoE in 2008) was almost equivalent to that of standard monetary 
policies, with an effect resembling complementarity rather than substitutability between the 
two (Lenza, Reichlin, & Pill, 2010). Fahr et al. (2011) argued, instead, that the ECB 
unconventional measures in the post-Lehman period (fixed rate full allotment, extension of 
maturities, just to mention some) were more successful than the standard ones in reducing 
credit differentials and incentivizing the concession of credit than playing a signalling role for 
the future policy stance (Fahr, Motto, Rostagno, Smets, & Tristani , 2011). Peersman (2011) 
and Boeckx et al. (2017), sharing the same standpoint, better specified the purposes of such 
interventions, namely targeting a restoration of the credit supply and assistance to the banking 
sector aimed at avoiding a collapse of the transmission channel. Divergently, they argue that 
these purposes are responsible for applicative discrepancies between conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy measures (Peersman, 2011) (Boeckx, Dossche, & Peersman, 
2017). Gambacorta et al. (2014) found that an expansionary unconventional monetary policy 
shock results in a significant but transient increase in output and price levels, an outcome that 
has been confirmed through a number of robustness checks involving various interferences of 
their model specification. The output effects are qualitatively alike to those typically described 
by researches relative to conventional monetary policy. The impact on the price level, 




2014). A conceptually different approach, which will be then reutilized in the following 
chapter, involving some interesting results, has been contributed by Kucharcuková et al 
(2016), who studied differing impacts of monetary policies types with a focus on international 
policy spillover phenomenon. The evidence provided by their results confirm that ECB 
unconventional shocks spill over to other countries outside the euro area. Conventional 
policies, on the other hand, has a considerably similar effect on industrial output and the 
exchange rate in all the euro nations they studied, but their impact on inflation results to be 
less significant or totally insignificant. Exchange rates tend to respond quickly, but the impact 
on output is less generalised compared to standard interest rate innovations. The heterogeneity 
observed depends on the characteristics of policies pursued in these countries, as well as on 
structural characteristics that explain trade and financial integration, a factor which proved to 
be fundamental for discussions on distributive equity of policies (Kucharcuková, Claeys, & 
Vasícek, 2016). 
Aggregating those evidences, many points of contact in macroeconomic consequences might 
be detected: both kinds of shock share a hump-shaped impact on economic activity flowing 
into a consistent higher level of consumer prices. Therefore, both types of instruments are 
helpful when applied for the purposes of policymakers. However, there are slight applicative 
divergencies that need to be highlighted in terms of aggregate consequences. In particular, the 
effects of policies targeted at affecting balance sheets turn out to be more sluggish in action. 
Approximately, whilst the impact on economic activity and consumer prices takes almost a 
year, in case of traditional interest rate policies, to peak, an equivalent approach takes about 
six months more in the eventuality innovations to the monetary base. Furthermore, bank 
interest rate differentials boost significantly, as well as rapidly, after an expansionary 
conventional shock, by contrast, such spreads consistently decrease after the implementation 
of a policy targeting the size of the ECB balance sheet (Peersman, 2011). Finally, orthodox 
interest rate policies imply the absence of considerable liquidity effects in the short-term, 
demonstrating the existence of a larger credit multiplier, which allows the concession of new 
loans. Instead, the multiplier results to be significantly weakened for a rise in bank lending 
which is caused by unconventional measures. Both the described aspects might be a 
consistent proxy of a potentially stronger risk-taking channel following interest rate shifts 
(Adrian & Shin, 2010) (Borio & Zhu, 2008). As a matter of meaning,  what some 
practitioners sought to underline is  that ECB’s policy reaction to the turmoil were not entirely 
"unconventional" in their essence (Borio & Disyatat, 2010). To better clarify this sentence, it 
is well known that the target of the major ECB policy approaches in the wake of the financial 




with the attempt of affecting longer term money market and bank lending interest rates. 
However, in normal times, the ECB would have attempted to affect interest rates both in 
credit and money markets without altering its main policy rate, for instance just by changing 
its signalling strategy (Peersman, 2011).  
Let’s now mention a connection which will prove its helpfulness in discussing the hypothesis 
of the overall work, namely heterogeneous implications of the bank lending channel. The 
theoretical background of this topic will be extensively explored throughout the second 
chapter. To shed more light on such consideration, an increase in the monetary base, typical 
effect of an unconventional policy action, is assumed. The increase of bank lending, resulting 
from the supposed liquidity injection, is connected to lending rates and therefore to the 
interest rate spread determined by banks as well. As a matter of fact, the credit multiplier 
declines significantly in the very first moments after the implementation and progressively 
returns to its former level after approximately one year. Hence, only a small share of the 
unconventional is passed on the amount of bank lending in the long run. In parallel, but in 
case of a policy easing, a traditional adjustment to the policy rate generates a significant rise 
of the interest rate spread determined by banks. More accurately, the conventional measure 
implemented by the ECB is transmitted to bank lending rates, but less than proportionally. 
The combined effect of decline in bank lending rates and the growing interest rate spread 
results in an increase of both credit demand and supply and, consequently, in a 
straightforward transmission to economic activity and inflation. The resulting additional 
divergency point is represented by a more rigid credit multiplier, which is rarely altered, 
together with the absence of significant liquidity effect in the short run. This differing 
response of the credit multiplier after both monetary policy shocks is particularly interesting. 
A potential explanation has to do with the so-called risk-taking channel of monetary 
transmission. (Mishkin F. , 2010) (Walsh, 2010). Precisely, following an interest rate decline, 
households typically tend to hold more currency than interest-bearing deposits. Consequently, 
less liquidity flows back to the banks, reducing the ability to provide loans accordingly and 
hence the credit multiplier as well is affected. In a similar fashion, a lower interest rate means 
reduced opportunity cost for banks to hold excess reserves, which also lowers the credit 
multiplier. At least two other effects, connected with the risk-taking channel are expected to 
influence the lending capacity of banks (Adrian & Shin, 2010) (Borio & Zhu, 2008). First, the 
effects of an expansionary monetary policy are deemed to be connected with the quality and 
value of outstanding bank loans through an increase in collateral and the expected associated 
repayment flows. Accordingly, the value of the bank’s capital on the market boosts, thus 




ultimately enlarges the proportion of loan supplies. Financial intermediaries will seek 
alternative allocations of their capital surplus. On the liability side, they take on more debt. 
On the assets side, they search for borrowers, which in turn expands the credit multiplier. 
Second, risk-taking attitudes of financial intermediaries are directly conditioned by bank’s 
interest rate differentials. When such spreads rise, the value of bank equity again raises, 
influencing their risk appetite and supply of credit. Crucially, the interest rate spread increases 
significantly after a conventional interest rate fall, whereas there is a significant decline 
following non-standard policy disturbances. The main point for the comparison is that this 
risk-taking channel of transmission appears to be much more powerful for a conventional 
approach relative to unconventional. This channel might, hence, represent an additional 
potential source of the substantial divergency in the predicted reaction of the credit multiplier 
after both kinds of monetary policy shock (Peersman, 2011). The argument explained above 
gives a potential reason for different transmission implications of conventional and 
unconventional measures adopted by the ECB, providing support to the hypothesis of a 
stronger risk-taking channel for an interest rate innovation as the main responsible of 
heterogeneities. 
The study of the credit channel, inclusive of the bank-lending and balance-sheet 
subdimensions, is relevant in the context of international research on heterogeneity topics, and 
it will prove to be helpful as well for the overall purpose of this work. Here, the discussion 
will be limited to few insights, in line with the objective of the paragraph, as the more detailed 
explanation will be a critical point for the discussion of further chapters of this work. Namely, 
conventional and unconventional measures are thought to have opposite implications on 
banks’ future capital position and thus on monetary policy transmission: while a traditional  
reduction in the short-term interest rate is typically associated with a steepening of the yield 
curve and an increase in the banks’ net interest income (bank capital channel), some 
unconventional measures are likely to generate a specular but opposite flattening of the yield-
curve, which erodes future profitability, giving raise to the so-called reverse bank capital 
channel (Van den Heuvel, 2002). The gradual shift from conventional to unconventional 
policies ensured the normalisation of lending standards, mitigating the cross-sectional 
fragmentation of lending rates and granting a wider pass-through in the medium run. The ease 
of lending standards for non-financial corporations materialised through the beneficial effects 
on the pass-through mechanism and the alleviation of dynamic funding cost relief and 
signalling effects. As evidenced by research, credit institutions with a major level of non-
performing loans and less capitalized were actually the most receptive to the polices and the 




credit easing program rather than banks not targeted by the central bank. Non-standard 
measures also played a major role for the standardization of the lending rates dynamics to 
privates, as a second stage of the transmission apparatus. It is common knowledge that the 
pass-through of standard policies to household lending rates is generally weaker compared to 
the response of non-financial corporations, and the reason of this different implication has to 
be researched in non-competitive pricing feature issues. Even though the mentioned effect is 
less significant, it shall be highlighted that even lending rates to privates fell substantially in 
response to non-standard measures and the major fact that many banks, in line with certain 
structural categories, were the most responsive to such policies, will be one of the 
cornerstones of the research question relative to the overall work.  (Altavilla, Canova, & 
Ciccarelli, 2016). 
A deeper overview of the various factors, as well as the motives, influencing the response of 
banks to a ECB monetary stimulus, will be given throughout chapter number 2, exploring the 
issue of heterogeneity in policies pass-through, and chapter 3, focusing on those banks’ 
balance sheet items which are thought to generate heterogeneity in such responses, according 
to the prominent theory of the bank lending channel. The transition in the perspective about 
how monetary policy is conducted, according to new objectives, directly targeting banks’ 
liquidity, could be explored as a potential factor for reducing that heterogeneous response, 
which is the centrepiece of most of the literature on the topic and that has been a major 
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2.1 From Pre-EMU uncertainties to crisis issues: a comprehensive literature review 
The overwhelming objective of the second chapter as a whole is to shed more light on a 
number of distributive issues related to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, 
moving from the existing international literature relative to the period prior to the 
establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU), characterized by a wide concern 
about the potential heterogeneous implications of traditional interest rate innovations, as a 
result of a unified financial system. Researchers are more vague when discussing similar 
apprehensions relative to unconventional policies that have been applied subsequently the 
Great Recession: empirical evidences are still contradictory and a common conclusion has not 
been reached yet, even if it seems, looking at aggregate results at the level of bank lending, 
that a tendency towards homogeneity might be in progress.  
Since the last decade of the previous century, in the attempt of establishing a unique currency 
and unifying the relative financial market, the countries of continental Europe have become 
more and more similar in many aspects (Cecchetti, 1999). As long as the new members of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) arranged the path for the beginning of the euro-era, whose 
starting point was set on January 1st of 1999, their approaches to monetary policy proved to be 
substantially more homogeneous and uniform. At that time, all the eleven countries initially 
present in the new euro area have virtually cancelled inflation threats and taken considerable 
steps toward fiscal consolidation. Such countries were consequently forced to adjust their 
monetary and fiscal measures to achieve these common goals, which made their business 
cycle fluctuations to have become apparently more synchronized as well (Angeloni & Dedola, 
1998). Although this mechanism may appear to ease the task of the Eurosystem (composed by 
the ECB plus the national central banks of the eleven monetary union members), a number of 
methodological issues were still concerning. Primary and more disturbing among these doubts 
was about how approaching policy-making in presence of the eventuality that it may generate 
non-homogeneous consequences across the target countries. Such applicative differentials in 
the transmission mechanisms of monetary stimuli in Europe imply that uniform policy 
impulses by the European Central Bank (ECB) lead to asymmetries in various business 
cycles. These, in turn, may finally make adjustment problems to arise, additionally generating  
tensions in the decision-making process of the ECB, which may likely lead to sub-optimal 
solutions (Clausen & Hayo, 2006). In other words, the introduction of the euro seemed to 
generate adjustments in the mechanisms of the member countries, and these alterations would 
likely modify the extent and modes of the connection between the moves of the central bank 




uncertainty (Cecchetti, 1999). The concentration of power for the conduction of monetary 
policy in the hands of a single entity has resulted in a unique decision-making process for all 
the EMU members, preventing national monetary institution from adopting individualized 
actions to buffer against country-specific shocks. In this scenario, the gradual conformity 
between the business cycles of the member economies, together with the pursued 
homogeneity of monetary transmission mechanisms, would be crucial for an effective rollout 
of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy. As a result, a major level of identification 
among national business cycles might involve heightened symmetry in the propagation of 
shocks across the EMU countries (Altavilla & Landolfo, 2005). As a matter of facts, even 
prior to the EMU founding, the future member countries were experiencing a sort of 
considerable convergence in their cycles (ECB, 1999). These signals of a common path 
towards coordinated business cycles became stronger and stronger after the official 
establishment of EMU, reinforcing expectations of convergence (Clausen, 2001). 
Notwithstanding, even in the years following the constitution of the monetary union, some 
relevant divergencies in transmission patterns were still likely to persist, even in the financial 
sphere, being the major point towards which researcher and practitioners directed their efforts 
(Mojon, 2000).  
Three basic criteria have been defined for establishing the value of empirical studies related to 
the pre-EMU period, in order to furnish consistent and reliable information on monetary 
transmission in the expected aftermath of the monetary union. These widely accepted criteria 
will serve as starting point for discussing the evolution of research on the topic across years. 
1. First, the direct implication of an interest rate shock on real variables could have been 
disentangled from its indirect counterpart via exchange rates. The latter channel had, 
in turn, to be separable into an intra-EMU and an extra-EMU component, within 
which the first lost its power after the constitution of EMU; 
2. The second requirement refers to the allowance, in the context of a research empirical 
setup, of a simultaneous change of monetary policy in all EMU countries; this would 
have an influence on the ways of modelling a common monetary policy in Europe. 
The rationale behind such criteria had to be researched in the occurrence of spillover 
effects within Europe, capable of modifying individual national responses;  
3. The third criteria reflected the emphasis placed on the empirical approach chosen, 
which shall provide informational support to the significance of asymmetries in the 




In the theoretical context of such criteria, some authors were predicting a quick adaptation of 
countries’ economic behaviours to the new monetary regime. According to this prominent 
perspective, research works based on the use of pre-EMU data have a very limited helpful 
informational role, from which the ECB might benefit. While some convergence in 
transmission mechanisms across the EMU over time was widely predicted and expected, there 
was general agreement on the conviction that these adjustments were likely to occur 
gradually. 
The one on convergence is not the only theoretical issue being the centre of researchers’ 
attention and efforts. The advent of the unique currency in Europe and the constitution of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), together with its eligibility as main actor for the conduction of 
monetary policy across the single currency area, have reignited the debate on optimal 
currency areas (Alesina & Barro, 2000). This debate was fuelled, in particular, by worries 
about the possibility that heterogeneities in the transmission mechanism of monetary policies 
across EMU members could worsen the existing cyclical divergencies, further complicating 
the task of the ECB in designing and implementing policies for the euro area. Additional 
complexities, arisen in recent times, namely increasing inflation spreads, divergent growth 
paths and premonitory signals of stagflation, have emphasized the challenges faced by the 
ECB, implying the necessity of a sound comprehension of the mechanisms of monetary 
policy transmission in the euro area (Clements, Kontolemis, & Levy, 2001). The results from 
pre-EMU research evaluating the effects of the monetary transmission mechanism, though the 
wide use of comparative methodologies aimed at testing relevant heterogeneities, in (the soon 
to be) euro-area countries have shown a considerable amount of variation, although sharing a 
few common topics. In an influential study, Gerlach & Smets (1995) concluded that the 
differential in the impact of monetary policy shocks across country was not so relevant; it was 
marginally more successful in Germany than in France or Italy (Gerlach & Smets, 1995). A 
different result was found by Dornbusch et al. (1998), who demonstrated that the effect of 
conventional stimuli on output, given the internal exchange rate constant, was about twice as 
large in Italy as in Germany and France, and about three times as large as in Spain, increasing 
the heterogeneity spread (Dornbusch, Favero, & Giavazzi F., 1998). On the same path, 
Ramaswamy & Sloek (1998) discovered that the full impact of an unanticipated tightening of 
monetary measures on output in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands 
took twice as long to occur and was twice as deep as in France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(Ramaswamy & Sloek, 1998). Definitely, despite the general disagreement of practitioners on 
the precise nature of a given individual country's reaction to monetary policy measures, just 




that output in Germany and France was more affected by monetary condition alterations than 
in either Spain or Italy.  
The above-mentioned stream of literature has been signed by a sort of shift of perspective 
concerning theoretical and practical uncertainties about the geographically unfair implications 
that a unique currency and a financial union would have caused. The traditional wisdom of 
the topic has always been centred on the assumption that some sectors of the economy are 
more reactive to interest rate shocks than others, so explaining differential effects across 
industries. The innovative perspective, based on the concept of financial structure of a 
country, both involves the former reasoning and adds further complexity by detecting that 
some firms are more dependent on bank financing than others, and that this holds both across 
and within industries. The mentioned mechanism, in accordance with the “lending view” of 
the transmission mechanism, assumes the capability of monetary policy actions to alter the 
extent of  the reserves available to the banking system, in turn conditioning the willingness of 
banks to provide credit, directly proportional to the supply of loans. This mechanism would 
heterogeneously impinge individual firms’ reactions depending on the financing alternatives 
they can choose from. The greatest impact has been detected on firms that are closely 
dependant on credit institutions for their funding. Furthermore, the more vigorous banks 
would be able to adjust their asset composition according to the policy changes more fluently 
than other, less healthy banks. The most relevant distributional effect implied by the so-called 
lending view of monetary policy transmission generates clear and concerning implications for 
the euro area. Countries in which firms are more bank dependent and banking systems are less 
healthy will be more sensitive to the Eurosystem’s decisions to implement conventional 
monetary measures (Cecchetti, 1999). In the context of the lending view, some commentators 
speculate that the increased liquidity of European financial markets subsequent to the advent 
of the monetary union would lead to significant consolidation of banks, with mergers at both 
the national and the international level, as well as a direct substitution of traded equities and 
bonds for bank loans (McCauley & White, 1997).  
The attention moved then at identifying which where the factors responsible for the variation 
in financial structures across euro countries. Traditionally, taxes and legal regulations have 
been chosen to explain such variance by many researchers (Dornbusch, Favero, & Giavazzi 
F., 1998) (White, 1998). Others, similarly, identified a number of barriers to change in 
national financial structure and highlighted the significance of the historical path that has 
brought each country’s bank system to its current state. Searching for the origin of such 




among EU states and, in particular, the absence of some uncontested form of European 
corporate law, contributed relevantly to explaining the geographical segmentation of Europe 
in terms of policy effectiveness (Danthine, Giavazzi, Vives, & von Thadden, 1999). 
Definitely, differences in countries’ legal structure might be identified as a proxy for their 
dissimilar financial frameworks, which might explain a large share of the heterogeneity in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. A correlation has been detected between these 
two variables: the financial structure of a nation depends on the extent of the rights protecting 
shareholders and creditors of the same country, as well as on the degree to which these laws 
are enforced. The nature of the laws is, in turn, a direct consequence of the legal tradition on 
which the civil codes of a country have been developed. Combining this argument with the 
preceding lending perspective of the transmission mechanism, one might state the possibility 
that the legal system in a country forms the basis for the structure of financial intermediation 
and, hence, for the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy on real variables across countries 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). The majority of the wide 
international literature just summarized here agreed on the fact that unless the individual 
countries’ legislations, involving shareholder and creditor positions, together with the 
enforcement of those laws, are harmonized across the members of the European Monetary 
Union, the heterogeneity in the real effects of monetary policy would not disappear. If such 
legal convergence did not occur, financial structures would remain heterogeneous, and so will 
the monetary transmission mechanism, and the main task of the ECB will be therefore to plan 
and implement appropriate policies, taking these asymmetries into consideration (Cecchetti, 
1999).  
To conclude the discussion on the motives of pre-EMU, introducing at the same time the 
following stream of research, it is worth to mention again the contribution of Dornbusch et al. 
(1998), who defined those three basic requirements for the validity of empirical studies 
related to the pre-EMU period. In particular, avoiding the repetition of the three requirements, 
which have been investigated in this paragraph, a fourth condition can be added. The creation 
of EMU and the corresponding change in the policy regime may result in a structural break in 
the transmission mechanisms in Europe. Indeed, some authors expect a rapid adjustment of 
economic behaviour to the new monetary regime (Arnold & De Vries, 2000). According to 
this view, analyses using pre-EMU data provide very limited information for the ECB. While 
we expect some convergence in transmission mechanisms across the EMU over time, these 
adjustments are likely to take place gradually (Hayo, 1999). In this particular case, historical 
data and related empirical studies continue to provide useful information about the 




Years of research passed and the uncertainty about the original cause of such heterogeneity, 
hampered by hypothesis of convergence towards a more homogeneous framework, has not 
been clarified yet. Additionally, the proliferation of the financial meltdown, started in 2008, 
has contributed to enhance complexity and to tighten the debate around such issues. With the 
spatially diverging impact that results from implementing monetary measures having 
repeatedly been demonstrated since the pre-EMU era, one question characterizing this more 
recent period is if these effects are still geographically distributed or if countries are instead 
clustering around different levels of responsiveness to monetary policy. A monetary cluster is 
defined, according to the major international literature, as a set of countries whose main 
economic variables react in a similar fashion to a specific ECB monetary policy. In the 
theoretical field analysed up to now, an analysis of monetary clusters might be intended to 
shed light on whether the dispute generated within the euro area regarding the nature of the 
measures implemented by the ECB since the break out of the economic and financial crisis 
has been related to the heterogeneous spatial impact arising from monetary policy or whether, 
by contrast, it is related to ideological issues (Dominguez-Torres & Hierro, 2020).  
As described in the preceding chapter, in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, the main central banks around the world were forced to approach 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) measures, aimed at adhering to their mandate of price 
stability. In the case of the ECB, the monetary policy response to the crisis has been shaped 
by the particularly large degree of heterogeneity across euro area members (Burriel & Galesi, 
2018). A wide branch of literature has been published over the last decade, exploring issues 
related to heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism. Georgiadis (2015) showed that the 
transmission of unconventional monetary policy shocks across economies of the euro area 
displays asymmetries which are driven by a number of key country-specific structural 
characteristics (Georgiadis, 2015). Ciccarelli et al. (2013) empirically proved that this 
heterogeneity has substantially enlarged with the financial and sovereign debt crisis 
(Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, & Peydró, 2013). Using bank-level data for the euro area, Altavilla et 
al. (2016) showed that the heterogeneity of pass-through of interest rate shocks on lending 
rates depends on bank-level characteristics such as the capital ratio, the exposure to sovereign 
debt, and the percentage of non-performing loans (Altavilla, Canova, & Ciccarelli, 2016). The 
main doubt would be related to the validity of the same bank-level characteristics for 
measures not involving interest rate shocks. Boeckx et al. (2017) assessed the effects of 
unconventional monetary policies in the euro area and documented that countries with less 




Most of the vagueness that could be inferred by having a look at the available bibliography 
still have to be connected to evidences at the micro level, analysing the behaviours of banks in 
response to actions from the ECB. Again, the bank lending channel seems to represent a 
central element in the determination of such geographical divergencies. Postponing the deep 
discussion of the motives of such relevance and possible implications related to the research 
question, the context of uncertainty, protagonist of an ongoing bibliographical debate, 
surrounding such unpredictably heterogeneous implications of monetary policy is perfectly 
synthetized by Mario Draghi, who, in 2013, stated: “during the crisis, normal heterogeneity 
has turned into detrimental fragmentation: a landscape with natural diverse scenery has turned 
into a dangerous surface with jagged cliffs and stumbling blocks” (Holton & Rodriguez 
D'Acri, 2015). Furtherly, the hypothesis of a potential convergence towards homogeneity, 
related to the purpose itself of unconventional monetary policy, will be argued subsequently 
in the course of the overall research work.  
 
2.2 A focus on the explored structural determinants of geographical asymmetries 
The discussion about cross-country heterogeneity, which could reasonably be considered the 
centrepiece of this second chapter, will now move towards and revolve around a brief 
description of those which have been depicted to be the major organic determinants of such 
asymmetries, throughout the extent of the international literature existing on the topic. Such 
initial overview is intended to provide some general information about the phenomenon, 
before delving into the details of that source of heterogeneity which appears to be more 
relevant in relation to the scope of this work, described throughout the subsequent paragraphs 
As highlighted in the preceding paragraph, partially in contrast with the prediction of potential 
convergence between the transmission mechanisms relative to EMU’s countries, some 
relevant asymmetries in such transmission patterns are still reluctant to be alleviated 
(Cecchetti, 1999) (Mojon, 2000). Moreover, the outlook of a future further EMU enlargement, 
with countries maintaining very different transmission profiles, keeps institutional concerns of 
monetary authorities in monitoring such asymmetric transmission across Europe (Clausen & 
Hayo, 2006). Europe's progressive steps towards a monetary union has been accompanied by 
an extensive ongoing debate on whether the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 
the potential member economies would have been converging sufficiently in the following 
years, and if not so, whether this heterogeneity could represent a concerning shortcut for the 
survival of the European Monetary Union (EMU). If such divergencies were generated by 




centralized monetary policy setting, defined by the European Central bank, would likely drive 
to asymmetric consequences. On the other hand, however, up to a certain extent the 
institutional revolution brought by EMU is likely to alter the traditional functioning of the 
transmission mechanism, analysed in the previous chapter, and systemically start an 
incremental convergence process (Ehrmann, Comparing Monetary Policy Transmission , 
2000). 
The potential perspective of a unique currency immediately raised, among practitioners and 
researchers, the key doubt of whether the consequences would have touched all Member 
States in the same way. The answer would then have depended crucially on the individual 
approach of each economy to a single currency, which is not straightforward to be 
acknowledged a priori. According to the traditional theory, it can be assumed that, in the long 
run, alterations in the stock of money will be fully transmitted to the price level, with 
insignificant or null effect on real output. But wages and prices are not completely elastic in 
the short to medium run. Therefore, modifications of monetary policy stances may generate 
repercussions on real output, differently from the long run. This nominal stickiness may partly 
be explained by incomplete adjustment of economic agents’ inflation expectations, and partly 
by the costs of gathering information about the adequate price to charge and of changing 
prices accordingly. Some theorists assert that these real implications of the transmission 
mechanism are largely the consequence of “structural” elements, like institutional dispositions 
or underlying components of individual attitudes that are independent from alterations in 
fiscal and monetary policy. These features help defining the accompanying significance of the 
different channels of monetary transmission. As a consequence, all of this may imply that 
such organic differences among states may be the reason for divergent responses to changes 
in monetary policy (Britton & Whitley, 1997). 
The above-mentioned debate, around the motives and means of cross-country heterogeneity, 
does not come without problems. One of them relates to the lack of agreement, among 
researchers, on what is meant by structural. Those asymmetries whose cause has been named 
as structural, can refer indifferently to the main channels of the transmission mechanism, 
described in the first chapter of this work: from alterations in policy interest rates to changes 
in market interest rates, including adjustments to the demand for goods and money, to the 
exchange rate, and so through, finally, to output and prices. It can be detected, nevertheless, 
that some of the asymmetries just outlined may not actually be structural, and that the 
connection between such structural differences and the real variables, like output and prices, 




covered in the following paragraphs, the variance among countries may relate also to the 
power of the banking sector to alter lending. This may be an implication of varying 
competitive pressure between the banking sectors of individual countries. The response of 
banks and other lending institutions depends inter alia on how long the alteration is predicted 
to be enduring, and partly on the costs of taking action in reply. Therefore, this rection is 
likely to be different according to diverse policy measures. Focusing now on the second stage 
of the transmission mechanism, that is, how initial changes in policy rates affect the real 
activity, the effectiveness of the procedure depends somewhat on how policy rates translate 
into interest rates more generally, as above, and also to some extent, on how interest rates 
impact households’ and firms’ decisions on expenditure and investment. As a review, 
modifications in nominal interest rates are likely to drive real behaviour of economic agents 
by impacting short-term real interest rates, which in turn may alter the rate at which 
households and firms replace future for current expense. These consumption decisions will 
also be affected by the current level of indebtedness, which may be partly determined by 
structural features (Britton & Whitley, 1997). The entity of any of the mentioned policy 
effects in each economy depends on a number of factors: the identity of both creditors and 
borrowers; their relative marginal propensities to consume; the magnitude of liquidity 
constraints. As an example, a significant grade of gross indebtedness may be a proxy for the 
absence of liquidity constraints and, with a given amount of net indebtedness, will be 
associated with weaker rather than stronger real interest rate effects on expenditure (Mayer, 
1994).  
Furthermore, among such “structural” features, even house ownership plays a role in 
contributing to divergencies in the transmission mechanism across countries. The funding for 
house purchasing across various states is often singled out as a primary reason for 
asymmetries in how real factors responds to shifts in interest rates. More specifically, greater 
owner occupation and a more frequent use of variable-rate finance have been mentioned as 
main reasons why real demand in the United Kingdom has been demonstrated to be more 
sensitive than in its European neighbours to alterations in the policy stance. The same 
elements are valid also for the funding activity of companies: whether their financing is at a 
variable or fixed rate will make no difference to the investment decisions they make in 
response to a shock, unless they are liquidity constrained. The adjustment to a new steady-
state inflation rate is then determined in either case by the extent of nominal stickiness, which 
in turn depends on how quickly agents learn about monetary policy as well as on institutional 
contract arrangements. So, a common monetary policy regime, as in monetary union, might 




reduction in nominal stickiness would reduce the real costs of adjustment to any shock. The 
behaviour of agents in the labour market is a key factor determining the extent of nominal 
stickiness. So, the degree of nominal stickiness may change as labour market reforms are 
introduced. For example, reducing the bargaining power of the unions, and increasing the 
flexibility of contract arrangements. Further asymmetries may be researched in the field of the 
exchange rate channel of the transmission mechanism, but this would be at the risk of losing 
the focus on the channel which will be investigated more carefully throughout the course of 
this work (Britton & Whitley, 1997).  
The domestic demand, together with other real variables, will also be impacted differently in 
the short run by a change in real interest rates, depending on the economy being open or 
closed. (Britton & Whitley, 1997). Theory predicts monetary policy to affect the economic 
response of various economies through several different channels, whose relative importance 
is a direct consequence of the degree of openness of the given economy. In closed economies, 
monetary measures impact market agents mainly through modifying the relative cost of 
borrowing and generating balance sheet effects. Thus, monetary stimuli are primarily passed 
down to the economy via their effect on consumption and investment demand. In open 
economies, on the other hand, the transmission of monetary policy results to be more 
complex, including a number of different channels, which operate through both the demand 
and supply side of the economy (Berument, Konac, & Senay, 2007). The demand channel, 
through which openness affects economic performance, functions through relative changes in 
the demand for domestically and foreign produced traded goods due to changes in the real 
terms of trade following the exchange rate response to monetary policy changes (Devereux & 
Engel , 2003). The exact magnitude of this demand channel effect depends on the extent of 
the expenditure switching between domestic and foreign tradable goods. In turn, the strength 
of the expenditure switching effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and foreign tradable goods (Sutherland, 2006). The portion of tradable goods in total 
consumption and production can also be considered a crucial feature in determining the 
demand effects of monetary policy. In relatively more open countries, this share is higher so 
the demand effects of a depreciation of the domestic currency are stronger. The theoretical 
literature adds a number of important explanations to reasonably foresee the impact of 
monetary policy to depend on the degree of openness. Berument et al. showed that the extent 
of openness of a given country carries different implications for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy on both output growth and the inflation rate among the sample used. A number of 
different specifications, including those using alternative definitions of money aggregates and 




the diversity of results. That is, the significance, the nature and the direction of the 
relationship between the degree of openness and the effectiveness of monetary policy on 
output growth and inflation respectively, are found to differ widely across countries under all 
the different specifications estimated. This may suggest that the relationship between the 
degree of openness and the effectiveness of monetary policy depends upon other factors, 
which are characterizing each considered country: real differences in exchange rate regimes, 
the degree of independence of central banks, the country’s exposure to international financial 
crises, terms-of-trade shocks, different monetary policymaking and the degree of capital 
controls could all potentially affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and thus 
have an impact on the relationship between openness and monetary policy effectiveness 
(Berument, Konac, & Senay, 2007). Definitely, other researchers confirmed such relationship, 
which has also proved to be significative in terms of generating that heterogeneity which is 
the major topic of the thesis. Karras (1999, 2001) carried out panel data analyses of different 
groups of countries finding that, respectively, for a panel of 38 countries (Karras, 1999) and 
of eight countries (Karras, 2001), a negative relationship exists between openness and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy on output growth and a positive relationship between 
openness and the effect of monetary policy on inflation can be detected. The diverse results 
highlighted in these papers imply that the effectiveness of monetary policy may depend on the 
different characteristics of each country, therefore contributing to generate cross-country 
heterogeneity. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the changing extent of financial frictions and, more 
generally, institutional barriers among countries may play a major role in explaining that 
cross-country heterogeneity that has been explored so far. Credit channel effects have been 
widely incorporated into general equilibrium models through costly state verification to 
enhance the empirical relevance of these models (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999). A 
key result from these models is that the strength of monetary transmission increases with the 
level of financial frictions. In particular, in financial systems where financial frictions such as 
the cost of monitoring (state verification cost) are more pronounced, monetary policy has a 
larger impact on output. Cross-country empirical tests of this result, however, are scarce. A 
key implication of this statement is that lowering the level of financial frictions may weaken 
the ability of central banks to affect economic activity. Monetary transmission appears to be 
more potent in other countries depending on the characteristics of a country’s financial 
institutions. In countries with greater financial frictions, borrowers may be more sensitive to a 
shift in the health of their balance sheet, making them sensitive to a rise in the external 




on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Specifically, deregulation and the ensuing financial 
innovation may have decreased monetary policy’s impact on banks’ ability to raise funds, 
which generates divergencies across different countries, thereby affecting the credit channel 
of the transmission mechanism (Aysun, Brady, & Honig, 2010). 
More in-depth insights about the structural features that matter for the transmission 
mechanism has been provided by Borio (1995), who investigated many components of credit 
to the non-government sector, providing a comparative overview of how these differently 
shape the individual response of different countries. According to the prominent theory, credit 
has traditionally been more debated in policy discussions in several continental European 
countries than in some Anglo-Saxon ones, especially the United States, partly because of a 
less pervasive monetarist tradition and the active use of direct controls on lending in the 
implementation of policy. At the same time, these differences have tended to narrow in recent 
years, as long as central authorities have abandoned direct control practises. In the wake of the 
broader deregulation process, financial structures have moved closer together; under the 
impetus of new analytical tools, the economics profession has revalued the role of credit in 
the context of asymmetric information between providers and users of funds. Several aspects 
of potential interest are considered: who provides the credit; who receives it; its currency 
composition; whether it takes the form of loans or securities; its maturity breakdown; the 
adjustability of the contractual interest rates charged; terms and conditions that may limit the 
suppliers' ability to control the amounts extended in the short term; and collateral. They affect 
the incidence of policy as between different sectors, such as households and businesses. They 
help to determine the relative significance of the channels of transmission, such as those 
operating through changes in the cash flow and balance-sheet positions of agents and those 
taking effect via changes in interest rates at the margin. They can affect the intensity of the 
response of private agents to a given policy impulse. Some of the main findings of that 
inquiry may be more easily summarised with the help of Table 3. The table highlights certain 
key characteristics of credit to the non-government sector. For any given characteristic, it 
assigns to each country a score ranging from 1 ("comparatively very low") to 4 
("comparatively very high"), highlighting small but significant differences across countries in 
responding to monetary stimuli (Borio C. , 1995).  
The following paragraphs will be dedicated to the more precise exploration of further 
potential reasons for the heterogeneous effectiveness of the transmission mechanism. After 
that, the focus will move towards the credit channel, whose main aspects have been already 




mechanism and, in particular, why it may be pointed out as the main responsible of cross- 
country heterogeneity. 
Table 3: Key characteristics of credit to the non-government sector 
 
Source: (Borio C. , 1995). 
 
2.3. The potential role of spillover effects in amplifying cross-country heterogeneity  
This brief paragraph aims at adding a degree of complexity to the topic of structural features 
amplifying differences across countries, which in turn make the responses of individual 
country to differ accordingly. Another point that is worth mentioning, before delving into the 
detail of the credit channel, which may be said to represent the link with that bank-lending 
channel, is the one of international spillovers. Those are especially relevant in the context of a 
monetary, commercial and political union, fertile ground for spillover phenomena, as they 
might be accounting for a variable share of that cross-country heterogeneity that has been 
described up to this point of the work. 
Aside country-specific structural asymmetries, which account for a sizeable share of 
heterogeneity in the rollout of monetary policies, also linkages among members of the euro 
area play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of unconventional measures, rather 
than conventional ones, through spillover effects. In this respect, President Draghi, in 2013 
also observed that (Burriel & Galesi 2018):  
• “Today’s economic and monetary union is larger and more diverse than a single 
country, such as Germany. It is highly integrated but still at times fragmented. And it 
comprises a very large number of policymakers on fiscal, structural and other 




together and that policies as well as policy inaction create spillovers for other 
members. This is an enormous responsibility for governments and other economic 
policy-makers.” (Draghi, 2013).  
Monetary policy adjustments operated by a major central bank tend to spill over to other 
neighbouring countries. In addition, the close integration in trade and financial markets 
foreseen by the European Union (EU) is likely to cause spillovers from centralized policies 
across member states. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that EU countries might be 
affected by a single monetary policy targeted to the Euro area, even without being members 
of the monetary union. For this reason, the orientation and magnitude of such phenomena 
generate great concern among policy makers and central banks in non-Euro area countries. 
Specifically, those countries shall stand ready to react to spillover phenomena caused by the 
European Central bank implementing a highly expansionary monetary policy, since the recent 
financial and Eurozone crises, as well as from a future withdrawal from that strategy. Turning 
to the positive side, to the extent that these countries actually experiment similar economic 
conditions, as belonging to the Euro area, symmetric spillovers derived from a Euro area 
monetary measure can act as an important stimulus which can play a crucial role in helping to  
close the output gap in these countries. If, on the other hand, such non-Euro area economies 
are already at a point of the business cycle where no additional monetary stimulus is needed, 
symmetric spillovers may imply a risky overheating of the economy with lower levels of risk 
perceptions, capital inflows and rising asset prices. A complete comprehension of such 
spillover phenomenon, together with its pro and cons, thus results to be essential for the 
design and implementation of appropriate domestic monetary and macroprudential policies, 
which in the ultimate case should allow to reap the benefits from strong economic and 
financial integration within the Euro area, while alleviating the associated dangers (Chen, 
Filardo, He, & Zhu, 2012), (Potjagailo, 2016).  
Spillovers of monetary policy are at the core of the discipline of international economics. The 
“impossible trinity” of a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows and an independent monetary 
policy arises from the sensitivity of international capital flows to monetary policy (Buch, 
Bussierè, Goldberg, & Hills, 2019). The literature on the international transmission of 
monetary policy stands to be complementary to the predominantly “closed economy” theory 
on which monetary policy transmission is based on. The leading methodology adopted lies 
down to various identification mechanisms of vector autoregressive models. These open-
economy VARs, which track the dynamics of both domestic and external variables, allow the 




evaluated. The majority of the empirical evidence examined in this work relates to the 
dynamics of external variables following monetary shocks. Identification relies in most cases 
on the assumption that a small economy is subject to shocks arising from a larger one 
(Kucharcuková, Claeys, & Vasícek, 2016). Typically, these dynamics have been researched 
with regards to the US, studying its relationship with smaller neighbouring countries, but, 
recently, research has been conducted on Europe as a whole, considering the evolution of 
international links that is a natural consequence of unification. Mackowiak (2006) provided 
some important empirical evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that a 
relevant share of the deviation in domestic variables relative to Central European countries 
can be explained by foreign shocks, in this case referred to the German economy 
(Mackowiak, 2006). Horváth and Rusnák (2009) found out for Slovakia (before it joined the 
EMU) that ECB policy impacted the real economy, in terms of some of the variables 
described so far, even more than domestic measures (Horváth & Rusnák, 2009). Finally, 
Feldkircher (2015), using a global VAR as econometric technique, argued that Central Europe 
reacts in a similar fashion both to US and euro area output shocks. On the other hand, ECB 
policy had a long-run effect on output in the region, although the impact was rather mild 
(Feldkircher, 2015). Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the cross-border effects of the 
unconventional approaches more recently undertaken by the ECB is practically almost non-
existent. The unique suitable contribution so far is Fratzscher et al. (2014), who analysed the 
impact of the most important UMPs of the ECB on asset prices in the euro area and globally. 
The major results they detected were a positive improvement relative to global equity markets 
and a lowering of credit risk between banks and sovereigns in G20 countries. Unlike what 
happed in the US, in relation to the Fed’s adoption of unconventional measures, the 
operations undertaken by the ECB did not lead to international portfolio rebalancing across 
regions and assets (Fratzscher, Lo Duca, & Straub, 2014). 
Previous streams of empirical work have been studying different aspects of monetary 
spillovers, working through volumes of flows, prices, or institutions involved in international 
flows. Considering the first two out of the scope of the work, let’s focus briefly on the role of 
banks and financial institutions, linking international spillovers with the credit channel of 
transmission mechanism, topic which will be the centrepiece of the following paragraphs of 
the chapter. This step may prove to be useful in relation to the aim of the thesis, that is to 
explore the dynamics of conventional and unconventional policies, and how they influence 
the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism. Research conducted in this theoretical field 
began from the sub-categories of monetary transmission traditionally analysed in the credit 




risk-taking channel. While country investigations actually did find evidence for these 
channels, practitioners also showed that transmission channels are much more complex than 
expected and relevant differences exist in scale and nature depending, for example, on the 
country from which monetary shocks steam, or whether inward or outward transmission 
channels are considered in the analysis. Perhaps most critically, there is not a single balance 
sheet item or bank characteristic that has proved to be the only determinant of banks’ response 
to monetary stimuli. Financial frictions, as described in the previous chapter, and bank-level 
characteristics, which will be the main topic of the following chapter, are therefore at the core 
of discussions relative to differentiated effectiveness of the transmission mechanism, 
including the influence of spillover phenomena. Frictions are in turn mirrored in the capital 
and liquidity position of individual banks, affecting their access to different types of funding, 
availability of collateral, or acceptance from internationally active banking networks. These 
frictions, relative to the country taken into consideration, have been proved to alter how 
monetary policy impacts bank lending activity, both domestic and cross-border. Extending 
such concepts to an international context, the costs of external funding in local versus foreign 
currency and the capability to handle foreign exchange risk through financial instruments, as 
opposed to manage it exclusively through balance sheet composition, can also play a decisive 
role. Exchange rate risks are likely to fluctuate depending on base currencies in foreign 
exchange regimes or with limitations on international capital flows. This focus on “frictions” 
captures the fact substantial heterogeneity in balance sheets and business models across credit 
institutions exist. Moreover, in order to gain some distinguishing insights, in times of 
conventional monetary measures, the liquidity composition of banks’ balance sheets may be 
relatively more important while, during periods of unconventional monetary policy, bank 
capital might become the more relevant. Applying such concepts, which will be regularly 
repeated and updated throughout this work, to the scope of the paragraph, it can be added that 
there may also be indirect effects of monetary policy implementation, for instance, through 
interbank lending phenomenon, widely recognized as the most unstable component of bank 
lending internationally. The research initiatives of many practitioners have explicitly found 
out, over years, that spillover phenomena of policy may differ in their impacts between 
periods of conventional monetary policy compared with quantitative easing or unconventional 
periods. Accordingly, Buch et. al. (2019), more recently, debated about the complexities in 
measuring policy stance during these latter uncertain periods, and alternative approaches have 
been used in the broader econometric analyses for robustness purposes. All the outcomes, 




policy, with tests for differences in international spillovers across conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy regimes (Buch, Bussierè, Goldberg, & Hills, 2019). 
To the best of the researchable theoretical knowledge, there is no study focusing specifically 
on the international spillovers of ECB policy operations into the real economy, so the final 
step of the transmission mechanism could not be analysed properly. Some of the measures 
ECB as unconventional actions are actually very up-to-date, while more may yet need to be 
potentially undertaken in the near future in case of further degeneration of the debt crisis in 
the euro area. In both cases described, nevertheless, they may end up with major and 
potentially dangerous impacts on the monetary policy decisions of neighbouring economies 
(Fratzscher, Lo Duca, & Straub, 2014). Definitely, a sound comprehension of the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks across national borders is crucial from both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the 
central doubt is whether adjustments to the extent of monetary policy and the adoption of new 
policy instruments do transmit into the real economy through lending to the nonbank sector 
by commercial banks. Considering the international environment, understanding the 
spillovers from monetary policy into bank lending activity across economies might prove its 
importance for the effectiveness of monetary policy and for financial stability. From a 
microeconomic perspective, on the other hand, the way banks react to monetary decisions 
taken by the ECB depends on bank-specific characteristics and the frictions that banks face. 
Different frictions on the asset and on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets would bind 
different conditions and may be particularly significant in particular categories of banks. The 
extent to which central bank activity affects bank lending in the international context can be 
clearly distinguished depending on the use of conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies, across banks which differ with regard to frictions on the asset and liability sides of 
their balance sheets.  
Three main findings may be extrapolated from the combined analysis of the streams of 
knowledge explored so far: 
• First, international spillovers of monetary policy into lending of banks are pervasive. 
Every country team studying inward transmission of foreign policy to domestic 
nonfinancial lending of resident banks found statistical significance. Outward 
transmission by banks through their local claims and cross-border loans is also 
evident. Transmission occurs both in periods of conventional and unconventional 
policy. During unconventional policy periods, specifications using the shadow policy 




• Second, while bank heterogeneity clearly matters for international transmission, the 
pattern of heterogeneity is not straightforward and individual. Bank features that proxy 
the frictions that banks normally deal with, such as liquidity positions and 
capitalization, can clearly matter. Country-specific idiosyncratic factors also influence 
patterns of international spillovers into bank lending. Cross-border assets and 
liabilities exposures of banks are most important for capturing heterogeneous 
transmission across banks into private sector lending growth rates. Some lending 
spillovers may be moderated by banks that rely more on internal capital markets, and 
in banking systems that have better and cheaper access to foreign currency risk 
hedging; 
• Third, the contribution of heterogeneity toward explaining overall cross-bank and over 
time variation in loan growth to nonfinancial borrowers differs greatly across 
countries. In general, this contribution is larger for emerging market economies and 
for some financial centres. The two forms of heterogeneity that matter most for inward 
transmission, including gross or net cross-border liabilities and intragroup funding (in 
conventional periods), can be associated with large differences across banks in the 
magnitude of international policy spillovers into credit extended to nonfinancial 
borrowers. International spillovers into lending can be large for some banks, even 
when the average international spillovers of policies into nonbank lending generally 
are not large (Buch, Bussierè, Goldberg, & Hills, 2019). 
Kept in mind the relevant connection, just highlighted, between the international spillover 
phenomenon and the individual countries’ banking systems, it can be stated that the 
effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, by means of the credit 
channel, may partly depend on international dynamics, other than structural features of both 
the economy and economic agents. The potency of such spillover effects has been 
demonstrated to be, as mentioned in the first chapter, a differential factor when comparing 
conventional and unconventional policies. Most euro area members benefit from these 
measures but with substantial heterogeneity, whose extent has been evolving over time and 
peaked with the sovereign debt crisis. Cross-country spillovers account for a sizable share of 
such dispersion, and substantially amplify its effects. Variance which seems to have been 
alleviated with the adoption of the most recent measures in response to financial turmoil 
(Burriel & Galesi, 2018). Burriel & Galesi (2018), in their relevant study of the spillover 




deviation UMP shock, decomposed into direct effects and spillovers. They presented two 
main results: 
1. Spillover effects dramatically amplify the effects of UMP shocks; 
2. A substantial part of the heterogeneity in effects is due to spillovers. 
Definitely, it is crucial to account for cross-country interdependencies and spillovers when 
assessing the transmission of monetary policy across euro area countries. Neglecting cross-
country interactions would substantially underestimate the effects of UMP shocks. 
Figure 3: Direct and spillover effects of UMP shocks. 
 
Source: (Burriel & Galesi, 2018). 
Further econometric studies are suggested on the topic, evaluating the exact relevance of the 
spillover phenomenon for the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism relative to non-
standard measures. Let’s now delve into the details of the credit channel, considering its 
subsequent stages, justifying its relevance relative to the scope of the overall work.  
 
2.4. The relevance of the credit channel for the transmission mechanism heterogeneity 
A great number of motives and dynamics of heterogeneity, from purely structural to 
international, from those relative to a single economic agent, passing through those related to 
an individual economy, to those involving a connection among countries, have been described 
throughout this chapter, in order to shed more light on what researchers and practitioners have 
worked on for years. From such general overview, let’s know focus on just one channel of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the credit channel, with its components and 
steps, in order to check whether and how some elements may undermine the unambiguous 




Before exploring the international literature on the topic, let’s briefly review the mechanism 
underlying the credit channel and its constituents, which have been described throughout the 
first chapter of this work. When the central authority tightens monetary policy by means of a 
squeeze in bank reserves, a correspondent cutback in the supply of bank loans might be 
generated. A bank can prevent this from happening following two alternative paths: 
• By altering the structural composition of its liabilities by issuing instruments not 
subject to a reserve requirement (such as CD’s or interbank loans); 
• Otherwise, it can decide to sell bonds to shield itself from the exogenous reduction in 
bank reserves. If neither of these alternative scenarios is realized, and the supply of 
loans is actually cut, the monetary shock will impact the real economy, unless firms 
are allowed to replace loans with bonds and commercial paper for no additional cost.  
This effect, widely known as “credit” channel of transmission mechanism, works, as just seen, 
on the supply side, complementing the more traditional “money” channel, that is the demand 
effect of a monetary shock, which influences new marginal expense by altering 3 borrowing 
conditions and by affecting asset prices, and thus the market value of wealth (Bernanke & 
Gertler, 1995). In a nutshell, in contrast with the traditional theory, highlighting the centrality 
of households’ decisions between money and other less liquid assets, the updated assumptions 
of monetary policy assert the crucial role of the banking sector for the transmission of 
monetary policy to the real economy. Specifically, two key variables draw the way in which 
monetary policy works according to the more recent literature:  
1. The extent to which banks rely on reservable deposit financing and adjust their loan 
supply schedules following changes in bank reserves; 
2. The extent to which certain borrowers are bank-dependent and cannot easily offset 
these shifts in bank loan supply (Kashyap & Stein, 1997).  
Lending standards are, therefore, a critical factor to be considered when evaluating the extent 
of economic activity and welfare of an economy. This consequence is particularly true in the 
euro area since both small and large non-financial corporations finance their operations 
largely through financial intermediaries. If firms were financially constrained, impairments of 
lending activities would affect hiring and investment procedures and, thus, the level of 
aggregate activity. Lending conditions, as a result, are also a concern for monetary policy 
authority: an ineffective, or better heterogeneously effective, pass-through of policy rate 
changes makes it much complex for a central bank to regulate the dynamics of aggregate 




During the 1990s a consistent stream of research has been devoted to test for the existence 
and effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The majority of them analysed the context of 
US, focusing on the systematic reaction of bank loan, other asset and deposit categories to 
changes in monetary policy stance, aggregate which has been proxied by changes in the 
federal funds rate (Altunbas, Fazylov, & Molyneux, 2002). In addition, these scholars also 
explored through their works whether monetary policy had an asymmetric impact on banks 
depending on: different asset size (Kashyap & Stein, 1995); asset size and liquidity (Kashyap 
& Stein, 1997a); asset size and capital strength (Kishan & Opiela, 2000). The totality of these 
inquiries stated the existence of a bank lending channel, mainly operating through small 
banks, which can be considered the main responsible for monetary transmission. The bank 
lending channel has also resulted to be intensified when such small banks are either relatively 
illiquid or undercapitalised. That is, the empirical evidence strongly pointed out the presence 
of a bank lending channel for small balance sheet constrained banks. A subsequent, and more 
recent, stream of research has been pushed by the European monetary integration, which in 
turn stimulated curiosity in the analysis of divergencies between financial systems among EU 
countries and their consequences for the relative monetary transmission mechanism 
(Dornbusch, Favero, & Giavazzi F., 1998). In the spirit of (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988), 
variety in the structural composition of financial intermediation and in the degree and 
structure of firms’ and households’ debt could imply differences in the effectiveness of the 
credit channel or, now, the bank lending channel of monetary policy in the euro area (Borio E. 
, 1996) (Kashyap & Stein, 1997) (Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, & Terlizzese, 1999). Empirical 
studies seemed to validate the significance of these asymmetries for various of the countries 
constituting the monetary and financial union at the time. For example, the credit channel has 
been found to be existing in Italy (Buttiglione & Ferri, 1994) (Angeloni, Buttiglione, Ferri, & 
Gaiotti, 1995) (Bagliano & Favero, 1995) (Fanelli & Paruolo, 1999) (Chiades & Gambacorta, 
2000), but not, or to a lesser extent, in France (Bellando & Pollin, 1996), Germany (Barran, 
Coudert, & Mojon, 1995) or the Netherlands (Garretsen & Swank, 1998). The research could 
have also been extended to other UE countries, such as the United Kingdom, where there is 
evidence of a significant credit channel, but with some evidence of a particular behaviour 
which is proper of Anglo-Saxon economies (Dale & Haldane, 1995). Apart from their 
different conclusions, these econometric studies point out the substantial information content 
of the spread between bank and bond market rates in explaining loan market disturbances and 
their impact on real output (Gambacorta, 2002). 
A sound understanding the transmission mechanism is crucial for monetary policy, which 




reaching this purpose, the particular function of banking institutions in this mechanism has 
been studied extensively both at a theoretical and empirical level. The existing evidence has 
demonstrated the voluntary alteration of bank attitudes, in specific ways, following a change 
in monetary policy. But does this response imply only adjustments to lending behaviour, as 
studied in the bulk of the literature? And do all banks in the market respond homogeneously 
to monetary policy changes, or is there some individualized and unique impulse for each 
bank? The effectiveness of monetary policy decisions steam from a number of bank features, 
namely liquidity, capitalization and market power (Brissimis & Delis, 2010). Other structured 
methodologies adopted over years by scholars, involving additional proxies for banking 
activity, will be treated more deeply in the following chapter, from an operative point of view. 
Here, the dissertation will be limited to various theoretical contributions to the concept of 
heterogeneity related to credit institutions. The aims of this paragraph are related to a long 
tradition in the literature of the transmission mechanism that accords banks a special role. In 
particular, (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988) among other proponents of the so-called bank lending 
channel, suggest that the effect of monetary policy on aggregate real variables through interest 
rates may be boosted by financial market imperfections and the existence of imperfect 
substitutability between loans and securities in bank portfolios and also as a means of 
borrowing for firms. The asymmetric behaviour of banks, both intra-nationally and 
internationally, evolves from their different balance sheet components. Theory on the bank 
lending channel detected a number of stimulating mechanisms that operate through the capital 
structure of banks, their liquidity levels and/or their size and argued that these structural 
elements may play a decisive part in modifying bank lending when a monetary policy shock 
is registered (Bolton & Freixas, 2006) (Diamond & Rajan, 2006).  A schematic representation 
is given, in figure n. 4, of how the bank-lending channel works and how it may contribute to 
generate cross-country or regional heterogeneity depending on the characteristics taken into 
consideration. 
Figure 4: Transmission of monetary policy through banks. 
 




In detail, a variation in monetary policy directly impacts lending, risk-taking and profitability 
of banks in a heterogeneous fashion because of differential bank characteristics such as 
liquidity, capitalization and market power. This will have, of course, immediate implications 
for the real economy, touching the aggregate economic activity in terms of spending, 
investment and consumption. Probably, the simplest and more at-hand aggregate empirical 
consequence of such bank-centric standpoint of monetary transmission is that bank loans 
should be tightly connected with benchmark measures of economic activity. What has been 
demonstrated is that, subsequent to changes in monetary policy, there is a strong correlation 
between bank loans and unemployment, GNP, and other key macroeconomic variables. 
However, such correlations may be detected even if the bank lending channel is not operative 
in that country. Moreover, the above-mentioned correspondence may be driven by the 
demand-side relative to bank loans rather than their supply. For example, bank loans and 
inventories might be moving together because credit institutions always keep their willingness 
to lend and firms fund their desired adjustments to inventory levels with bank loans (Kashyap 
& Stein, 1997)  
This heterogeneity, which arises from differential bank balance sheet characteristics, such as 
liquidity, capitalization and size, has been examined by a number of theoretical and empirical 
studies mainly in the conceptual framework of the bank lending channel. What will be 
explored below related to the main implications of bank structural diversity for the reaction of 
banks in terms of lending, risk-taking and ultimately profitability to monetary policy impulses 
(Brissimis & Delis, 2010). As seen earlier on, some of the bank characteristics exploited for 
matters of empirical analyses were those of liquidity, capitalization and size (Gambacorta, 
2005). Many researchers diverged from adopting size as the third bank balance sheet feature 
affecting banks’ reaction to monetary policy shocks. The main argument for selecting size as 
a variable has to be researched in the prediction that largest banks may have an easier time 
raising uninsured funding, which would make them and their activity less reliant on monetary 
policy shocks regardless of other bank characteristics (Kashyap & Stein, 2000). Nevertheless, 
this mechanism implicitly shows that certain banks may possess market power in raising 
uninsured finance, something that may or may not be the result of size. This feature naturally 
is carried over to the asset side of bank balance sheets generating forms of divergence from 
perfectly competitive behaviour (Brimmis & Delis, 2010). It is also remarkable that Lensink 
& Sterken (2002), in editing a special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance, provided 
some suggestion for future research: in particular they recommended to investigate on 
whether and how bank competition plays a role in the monetary transmission mechanism. 




liquidity and capitalization to estimate the potency of monetary pass-through. In the context 
of the bank lending channel, Kashyap & Stein (2000) among others, suggest that the influence 
of monetary policy on lending behaviour is more intense for banks with less liquid balance 
sheets (Kashyap & Stein, 2000). In a recent theoretical study, Diamond & Rajan (2006) 
defended a different mechanism through which the bank lending channel may be operating. In 
particular, they logically advocate that an expansionary open market operation improves the 
level of financial liquidity, thereby mitigating the real liquidity pressures on banks, which in 
turn eases them to finance longer-term projects and with a beneficial effect on aggregate 
economic activity. This implies that the aftermath of monetary policy is further magnified 
when credit institutions keep a higher value of liquid assets, especially in the context a low 
interest rate environment, because banks would then tend to spend the extra liquidity in their 
portfolios to make new loans. As a result, expectation about lending and profitability of these 
banks are likely to boost above average (Diamond & Rajan, 2006). Turning to the effect that 
enhanced liquidity may exert on the relationship between policy rates and bank risk-taking, 
one could expect banks with higher levels of liquid assets, condition that reflects high risk 
aversion, to be less incentivized to take on more credit risk after an expansionary monetary 
policy. To the extent that this holds, the impact of monetary policy on bank risk is weakened. 
Also, if banks with relatively illiquid portfolios face higher risks, due for example to a 
prolonged period of low interest rates, then these banks may be less able to use part of their 
liquidity in less risky activities and mitigate credit risk accordingly. However, it may also be 
the case that excess liquidity of banks in a low interest rate environment provides stimuli for 
enhanced risk-taking when credit institutions feel particularly safe (situation that represents a 
moral hazard problem). These circumstances, although not reflecting a typical bank attitude, 
can lead to a deterioration of the quality of its assets and a sharp increase in the degree of 
undertaken risk (Brissimis & Delis, 2010). Following again the methodology of Brimmis & 
Delis (2010), three relevant hypothesis could be formulated: it can reasonably be expected the 
impact of a monetary policy change on bank lending, risk-taking and profitability to decrease 
(increase) with higher (lower) levels, respectively, of bank liquidity, equity capital and market 
power (or, more generally, size). In order to gain some helpful insights on these dynamics 
from which heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism steams, many econometric 
techniques have been used, based on the behaviour of individual banks. These methodologies 
will be described in the following chapter, through a more on-the-field perspective, exploring 
pro and cons relative to each one of them.  
Let’s now properly explain the significance of the bank-lending channel, centrepiece of this 




effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, corresponding to the 
passage from conventional to unconventional measures adopted by the ECB. The latter helped 
to normalise lending conditions, reducing the cross-sectional dispersion of lending rates and 
producing a more homogeneous pass-through in the medium run. Better lending conditions 
for non-financial corporations materialised because of the improvement of the instantaneous 
pass-through and because of dynamic funding cost relief, together with the rise of signalling 
effects. Banks with a high level of non-performing loans and a low capital share were the 
most responsive to the measures and banks with higher uptakes in the credit easing operations 
reduced lending rates more than banks not participating in the program. Non-standard 
measures also played a major role in regularizing the dynamics of lending rates to households. 
It is well known that the pass-through of standard policy measures to household lending rates 
is generally lower than that to non-financial corporations, and that non-competitive pricing 
features explain this difference. Even though the effect is smaller, lending rates to households 
fell substantially in response to non-standard measures and banks with a high level of non-
performing loans and a low level of capital responded most (Altavilla, Canova, & Ciccarelli, 
2016). Non-standard measures compressed banks’ lending margins significantly. When 
pricing frictions are present, monetary policy may alter lending margins (Gambacorta, 2008) 
(Alessandri & Nelson, 2015). It has been ascertained that the compression of lending margins 
is more pronounced for banks with a low level of capital, a higher exposure to sovereign debt, 
and a higher share of non-performing loans. Thus, while non-standard measures decreased 
funding costs for a class of banks, they hampered a component of their profitability, 
potentially making the banking system more vulnerable to shocks (Altavilla, Canova, & 
Ciccarelli, 2016).  
Before concluding the chapter, a brief literature review about the theorical attempt of 
designing an optimal monetary policy, one that takes into account that cross-country 
heterogeneity which has been described so far, will be provided. Such overview will be aimed 
at providing a theoretical background on the main properties and effects of an optimal 
solution in terms of policy making. Moreover, the exploration of those methodologies might 
serve as baseline for future streams of empirical research which, drawing on the approaches 
which have been adopted so far, evaluating pro and cons and combining them, would aim at 






2.5 The attempt of designing an optimal monetary policy which takes into account cross-
country asymmetries 
The mandate of the European Central Bank, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty, states, 
through article 105 (1), that the primary objective of monetary policy shall be those of 
maintaining price stability over the medium term in the euro area. While avoiding acting to 
the detriment of such objective, the ECB shall, moreover, support the general economic 
policies in the Community, including sustainable and non-inflationary growth. The focus of 
the ECB is therefore on price stability in the euro area as a whole, adopting an aggregate 
perspective. Concerns about the performance of individual countries belonging to the union 
are not normally considered in policy decision-making process (ECB, 2005). Despite the fact 
that the ECB may potentially use a wide set of economic markers, comprehensive of country-
specific ones, in order to fulfil this primary objective, it normally takes initiative according to 
Euro-level aggregates, while national idiosyncrasies are left to the attention and action of 
single national governments. The results of such a limitation on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in the euro area are obviously related to the extent and the nature of heterogeneity 
among economies within the area. Since the centralized choices have to be defined on the 
basis of aggregate developments only, theorists and practitioners may be arguing that, given 
the fact that targets are thought in cumulative terms, an area-wide model (AWM) would be 
enough for explaining most of the features of the euro-area whole economy. As opposite, a 
multi-country model (MCM) may prove to be helpful in capturing the variety of reaction 
within single countries, therefore offering precious insights about the conditions of the entire 
economy, facilitating, consequently, the planning and implementation of a more suitable 
monetary policy rule. As a result, it is not clear a priori what type of predicting model (multi-
country or area-wide) should be preferred for programming the execution of an optimal 
monetary policy (Jondeau & Sahuc, 2008) 
In order to explore the role and significance of country-specific information affecting the 
decision process with regard to the Eurosystem, the standard approach to policy appraisal can 
be followed: the optimal policy rule, upon which decisions are taken, is established so as to 
minimize the expected value of an intertemporal loss function, under the constraint provided 
by a low-dimensional multi-country model of the euro area (Taylor, 1999). Supposing, as just 
said, that the monetary central authority is exclusively targeting area-wide objectives, it is 
possible to compare the performance of two optimal reaction functions based on an MCM and 
an AWM, respectively. Such operative procedure has already been tested by a number of 




with ignoring country-specific information might be significant. Nevertheless, in these 
studies, the underlying macroeconomic models are not envisioned in an optimization-based 
framework. As a result, the optimal monetary policy rule extrapolated from such models is 
subordinated to the Lucas critique, as it may be accused to be based on a reduced form, rather 
than on structural features and parameters. This may represent a concerning restriction when 
the target of the analysis consists in the appraisal of the welfare resulting from an optimal 
policy rule (Jondeau & Sahuc, 2008).  
Research on the topic of ECB monetary policy strategy formulation and implementation has 
expanded in recent years. Most scholars focused their attention on the definition of the 
adequate monetary policy rule and the subsequent welfare optimization that can be achieved 
through the usage of this rule. Little consideration, however, has been directed toward the 
concern of data aggregation and the relevance of national asymmetries for the success of the 
common monetary policy. Although the fragmentation of economic aggregates across 
member countries is deemed to be a standard feature of any monetary union related to the 
convergence process, in the European monetary union it can also be, at least up to a certain 
degree, ascribed to diverging national policies and long-lasting structural inefficiencies, such 
as nominal and real rigidities in product and factor markets. Kept in mind the prospect of a 
widening of the European monetary union, national divergencies are expected to become even 
more significant, creating potential dramatic costs in terms of the union’s whole economic 
performance. Therefore, it may be insightful, for practical purposes, to analyse the benefits for 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area, arising from the integration of national 
information into interest rate decisions, as opposed to the inclusion of only aggregate union-
wide variables (Brissimis & Skotida, 2008).  
The importance of incorporating national information when the central bank of the European 
monetary union decides on monetary policies to be implemented has been studied empirically 
by De Grauwe (2000), De Grauwe & Piskorski (2001), Angelini, Del Giovane, Siviero, & 
Terlizzese (2002) and Monteforte & Siviero (2002). In particular, the authors evaluated, using 
the framework proposed by Rudebusch & Svensson (1999), the performance (relative loss) of 
rules targeting national variables as opposed to union-wide variables for calibrated aggregate 
demand and supply equations. All of them, except De Grauwe & Piskorski (2001), discovered 
that the first type of rule may generate large welfare gains. Further research by Angelini, 
Siviero, & Terlizzese (2006) demonstrated the potential capability ECB to align national 
economic cycles by integrating the inflation dispersion across member states into the 




recent study, Jondeau & Sahuc (2008) estimated, using Bayesian techniques, a multi-country 
model for three core euro area countries, comparing their performance on various dimensions 
and found that using an area-wide model may entails relatively significant losses. Finally, 
Benigno (2004) and Lombardo (2006), using two-country optimizing models, explored the 
topic of optimal monetary policy applied to a currency area, like the European monetary 
union, traditionally characterized by asymmetric shocks across countries. According to the 
former, an optimal inflation targeting policy shall assign a greater value to the inflation of the 
country with the major extent of nominal rigidity. The logic underlying this mechanism shall 
be that differences in price flexibility affect relative prices across members of a currency 
union, inducing output fragmentation and endangering the welfare of the currency area. 
Similar results have been achieved by Lombardo (2006) on the basis of the degree of market 
competition. Jondeau and Sahuc (2008), finally, focused their efforts towards the modes and 
functioning of cross-country heterogeneity and the ways it shall impact the draft of an optimal 
monetary policy within the euro area. Technically, they took two alternative modelling 
approaches into consideration for the analysis. In both of them, the central bank establishes its 
priorities and its loss function at the area-wide level, and the reaction function is designed in 
terms of aggregate variables only. In the first approach, the MCM, estimated using country-
specific information, is exploited for figuring out the loss function, while in the second 
approach, the AWM, estimated using aggregated data, is adopted. The optimal monetary 
policy that maximizes the aggregate welfare, both under the AWM and the MCM, is then 
computed, and, finally, a measure of the welfare cost of using the AWM (suboptimal) 
forecasting model is provided. The results of the analysis points towards the moderate 
significance, both statistically and economically, of the welfare cost. Moreover, it seems to be 
correlated mainly to nominal rigidities rather than to real rigidities (Jondeau & Sahuc, 2008).  
The paper by Brissimmis & Skotida (2008) contributed relevantly to the literature on the 
optimal design of monetary policy in the European monetary union in the presence of 
structural asymmetries across union member countries by analysing the reliance of the 
coefficients of the interest rate rule on the parameters of the structural model of each 
economy, the central bank’s predilections for inflation and output stabilization, as shown in 
its loss function, and the relative size of each country. As a complement of the other existing 
literature, they allowed for additional types of asymmetry, considering the existence of more 
than one category of divergencies, better reflecting the concrete context of the transmission 
mechanism. They evaluated the optimal weight that each country’s economic variables should 
be attached by the central bank in its interest rate reaction function using the parameters of the 




improvement that would be achieved through the execution of such a decision compared to a 
rule that focuses only on union-wide variables. The outcomes achieved indicated that an 
optimal monetary policy decision making rule should take into consideration not only the 
relative size of the countries as at present (relative output or population), but also the 
structural characteristics of the economies, which are some of the determinants causing 
dispersion in the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism (Brissimis & Skotida, 2008)  
A number of recent theoretical studies have explored the consequences of cross-country 
heterogeneity on the outlining of an optimal monetary policy, demonstrating in particular that 
the existence of asymmetries in the transmission channel might be a stimulus for taking 
account of “national information” and not only “average information”. More specifically, in 
the attempt of stabilizing only average inflation rate and output-gap, the common central bank 
touches a lower level of social welfare than that which would have been achieved if the same 
was only worried of the consolidation of national inflation rates and output-gaps. Therefore, 
importantly, the incorporation of national information into the decision-making process for a 
common monetary policy allows the central authority to more effectively deal with the 
heterogeneity issues stimulated by the structural asymmetries. Nonetheless, a crucial concern 
still involves the modes for taking national information into account. Two responses to this 
question may be envisaged:  
1. An institutional response, inspired from the recent results in the literature; 
2. A contractual response, inspired from the literature on the agency problem in a 
principal-agent relationship framework, optimally solved if the principal imposes the 
“good” contract to the agent (Semenescu, Gregoriadis, & Villieu, 2008). 
Analysing the former, De Grauwe & Senegas (2004) proposed that the function of the 
common central bank should be the one minimizing a loss function, envisaged as a weighted 
average of national loss functions. In the context of the EMU, such an institutional solution 
would require the central bank to alter the traditional way monetary policy is designed and 
implemented, because nowadays, as stated in the Treaty, each member country “is therefore 
well aware that he or she is not a representative of a country, but shall act in deciding the 
appropriate conduct of monetary policy for the euro area as a whole”. Furthermore, the 
negotiation phase necessary to agree on a common hypothesis could potentially give birth to 
inflation biases or conflicts conducting to noncooperative solutions in the Union, so that the 
cure might become worse than the disease (De Grauwe & Senegas, 2004). Semenescu et. al. 
(2008) presented an alternative practise for monetary policy to gain national insights, to be 




Union (acting as the “principal”) would agree to delegate monetary policy to an “agent” who 
is the common central bank. With such a contractual agreement, monetary policymaking 
remains responsibility of the common central bank, who operates as an independent agent, 
but, as in the traditional agency theory, the “principal” has to grant the adequate stimuli to the 
“agent”. As a result, what researchers have been looking for was an optimal form of this kind 
of arrangement, namely an optimal contract for the common central bank, and it can be 
showed that such an optimal contractual solution exists in nature. This type of agreement 
takes into account national information for the purpose of monetary policy decision-making 
process if penalties are imposed to the central bank in function of the weighted standard 
deviations of inflation and unemployment in the Union. Clearly established values for these 
penalties can help enforcing the optimal solution for monetary policy, allowing the 
optimization of Union-wide social welfare (Semenescu, Gregoriadis, & Villieu, 2008).  
The quality of EMU performance with regard to the planning stage of such an optimal 
monetary policy will depend on the way it fits the notion of an optimal currency area (OCA). 
Specifically, economic theorists have long assented on the following four criteria to be met 
for a region to be considered an optimal currency area: 
1. Countries should be exposed to similar sources of disturbances (common shocks); 
2. The relative importance of such common shocks should be similar (symmetric 
shocks); 
3. Countries should have similar responses to common shocks (symmetric responses); 
4. If countries were affected by country-specific sources of disturbance (idiosyncratic 
shocks), they would need to be able to adapt rapidly to the context.  
The basic idea is that economies meeting these requirements are said to behave similarly with 
respect to their business cycles, so a common monetary policy reaction would be optimal. 
Many economists are still are critical and skeptical about the long-run survival of the EMU. 
Euro-zone members have renounced to their freedom to establish their own interest rates and 
to the possibility of altering their exchange rates against each other. The widespread view is 
that this loss of flexibility may involve significant costs (in the form of persistent high 
unemployment and low output growth) if countries are not able to act as a common one or 
cannot easily adjust in other ways. The definitive apprehension is represented by the 
possibility that some countries, concerned about the prediction of such macroeconomic costs 
balancing out the microeconomic benefits of unification, would decide to abandon the EMU. 




research, asking whether an apparent potential deviation from the OCA concept would be 
sufficient to threat the long-run viability of the EMU. On an empirical ground, the outcomes 
obtained appear to foster the skeptics’ conviction that the EMU is not an OCA, for at least 
two reasons. First, European economies have tested recurrent and often dramatic idiosyncratic 
shocks over recent years. Second, consistent severe unemployment levels across Europe may 
proxy the fact that EMU economies (especially their labour markets) are sluggish to adjust 
subsequently to all economic turmoils that might occur (Kouparitsas, 1999).  
To conclude, the cost of ignoring the above described theoretical issues of cross-country 
variance within the euro area when designing and planning the execution of the presumed 
optimal monetary policy has been assessed again by Jondeau and Sahuc (2008). It may be 
argued that the cost of developing, estimating, and applying an MCM is rather severe, 
envisaging that the AWM would be less costly to implement. However, estimated 
measurements of the difference between the AWM and the MCM in terms of welfare are 
relevant. It is likely that including additional economies in the estimation, while normally just 
the few of them which are deemed to be in line with the purpose of the analysis are 
embedded, would even enlarge the inconsistencies between the two models. Using more 
complex frameworks incorporating different fiscal policies and labour market characteristic, 
adding therefore some degrees of sophistication, shall also tend toward higher welfare losses 
(Jondeau & Sahuc, 2008).  
The chapter which is just to be concluded aimed at theoretically exploring, following the 
direction of various streams of international literature, the motives of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, taking into consideration the variability of its effectiveness. 
The literature review on such heterogeneity has been divided and described according to two 
main flows, with the advent of the EMU as a crucial point for research. An exploration of the 
structural features affecting the potency and geographical distribution of monetary policies’ 
effects has been provided, with a particular focus on the relevance, both for the literature and 
for the scope of the thesis of the bank-lending channel as a particular declination of the 
transmission mechanism. A reduction of cross-country heterogeneity in the bank lending 
channel, corresponding to the passage from conventional to unconventional measures of 
monetary policy has been detected in the field of spillover phenomena, especially relevant at 
the Union level. Finally, the attempt of many researchers to establish some rules for optimal 
monetary policy definition, in a context characterized by changing effectiveness of the 
transmission mechanism, has been explored, highlighting its cost and benefits, with a forward 




in the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism, parallelly to the gradual passage from 
conventional to unconventional monetary policies, through a more operative lens, in order to 
































 Comparative overview of conventional and unconventional policies: differing 





3.1 Research question explanation: is the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism 
altered through the implementation of unconventional policies? 
The conclusive chapter, which is just to begin, aims at combining the previous ones in terms 
of integrating the theoretical concepts presented, that are central to them, through an operative 
perspective, exploring methodologies and relative systematic difficulties, in order to provide 
future researchers, willing to commit to the empirical investigation of such question, with an 
helpful framework to provide more structured and complete answers.  
The basic idea underlying the design of such work is that of analysing the implications of the 
transition from conventional to unconventional measures of monetary policy, prompted by the 
unleash and spread of the financial crisis, on the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism, 
connected to the issues of cross-country heterogeneity described across chapter number two. 
As observed, thanks to an in-depth literature exploration, the most frequent cause of such 
geographic dispersion in the effectiveness of ECB’s interventions is represented by the 
behaviour of credit institutions, differing along various characteristics that alter their reaction 
to monetary policy decisions undertaken by the central bank. What has been showed 
throughout the course of this disquisition about unconventional policies compared to 
traditional approaches is that, in particular, a policy measure aimed at raising the monetary 
base or the extent of the central bank balance sheet for a given policy rate, has a reversed U-
shaped impact on real activity and persistent consequences on prices felt by consumers. If 
compared to a traditional interest rate adjustment, the pass-through has proved to be more 
slow-moving. Moreover, the functioning of the transmission process for both types of policy 
instruments turned out to be slightly different. While an alteration in the balance sheet of the 
European Central Bank is conveyed to bank lending activity via a decay in interest rate 
spreads of banks, the same spreads have been shown to boost significantly after a fall in the 
policy rate, which stands for a traditional monetary shock. Moreover, the so-called credit 
multiplier deteriorates remarkably subsequent to a balance sheet shock. Conversely, the surge 
in the volume of lending activity after the implementation of a conventional measure is 
mainly generated by an improved multiplier. A potential reason underlying such asymmetry 
might be researched in a stronger risk-taking channel for an interest rate innovation, a feature 
which might be worthwhile to concentrate on for future researchers wishing to widen the 
knowledge on such concerning field (Peersman, 2011).  
It may be useful to also analyse the extent and modes through which the various euro area 
countries are affected by the balance sheet shocks. This might be performed by having a look 




model to dynamically investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies, which 
might turn to be a helpful insight for the purpose of this work. The aftermaths on real activity 
proved to be slightly dissimilar if compared with interest rate adjustments. These outcomes 
were relatively wide in Germany, Finland, Estonia, Ireland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and 
Luxemburg, while they were detected to be much more subdued in France, Italy, Austria and 
Belgium. The same measures were ascertained to be almost insignificant in Spain, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Cyprus. For Greece, they even found a confusing negative response 
of output to a balance sheet expansion. On the other hand, as shown in the following figure, 
the effects on consumer prices are much more similar across countries. Hence, there is little 
evidence that in countries where output reacts more (less), also inflation reacts more (less).  
Figure 5: Impact of balance sheet shocks on output (first row) and prices (second row). 
Comparative overview for four major euro countries. 
 
Source: (Boeckx, Dossche, & Peersman, 2017). 
Since the peripheral countries of the euro area were more frequently targeted by the ECB with 
its nonstandard measures of monetary policy,  the outcome of a much more vigorous impact 
of expansionary (and restrictive) balance sheet shocks in countries that are generally less 
susceptible to the financial crisis turned out to be quite impressive. A potential interpretation 
of this phenomenon relates to the fact that the majority of credit institutions in those 
peripheral countries have not been able to translate the extra liquidity they received into more 
credit to the private sector because of their financial precariousness and low capitalization.  
With respect to the applicative divergencies between conventional and unconventional 
shocks, Burriel & Galesi (2018) compared the euro area implications of UMP shocks against 




global VAR model involving all the member states belonging to the monetary union. The 
multi-country structure of the methodology was specifically designed to account for national 
macroeconomic trends as well as cross-country interconnections (that is, the spillover 
phenomenon which has been demonstrated, in chapter number two, to be hampered in relation 
to unconventional shocks). At the individual country-level, most of the euro area members 
profited from the employment of unconventional policies, but with a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity, whose stance has been evolving over time and reached its maximum with the 
sovereign debt crisis. Spillover phenomena constitute a substantial share of such 
fragmentation, magnifying the real consequences of UMP shocks. Countries with more 
vulnerable banking systems tend to get the minimum benefit from unconventional monetary 
policies application, particularly in terms of output growth. Definitely, what generates 
concern is the fact that this heterogeneity has dramatic consequences for the conveyance of 
unconventional measures at the euro level, as it substantially restrains the desired impact on 
the real activity of the whole currency union. In this respect, the authors also furnished a proof 
of how the real implications of unconventional monetary shocks are significantly weaker and 
less enduring than those related to conventional interest rate adjustments (Burriel & Galesi, 
2018). The disquisition about which types of variables are more suitable for such kind of 
analysis, whether macro or micro data (related to the balance sheet of credit institutions as 
main responsible of cross-country asymmetries) will be more precisely tackled in the 
following paragraphs. Figure n. 3 presents Euro area countries’ responses to UMP (left-hand 
side) and CMP (right-hand side) adjustments, in terms of one-standard-deviation shocks.  
Solid red lines stand for the median approximations and blue regions designate the 16th and 
84th percentiles of the selected distribution. 
Figure 6: Euro area responses to unconventional and conventional monetary policy 
shocks 
 




The research question which will be investigated across this third chapter of the research shall 
then be clear, thanks also to examples from the international literature which have just been 
provided. The idea is the one of demonstrating, through an in-depth literature analysis, which 
allows a comparative overview of such an unexplored field of research, accompanied with a 
number of official ECB statistics, the existence of divergencies in the effectiveness of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, depending in particular on the nature of the 
action approached by the ECB. Drawing on the conclusions of many researchers about the 
issue of cross-country heterogeneity, a final overview of which features, and to which extent, 
contribute to influence the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, 
will be presented. Moreover, some predictions about the potential evolution of the influence 
that such elements may exert in case of implementation of an unconventional policy will be 
discussed. The relevance of the result shall therefore be twofold: providing a conceptual 
starting point for future empirical research together with the suggestion of many 
methodological approaches that might be undertaken, specifying pro and cons for each of 
them. In particular, the more formal procedures involve the design and approximation of 
econometric models changing starting points, to check different ways of implementing them, 
and techniques. The starting point is generally rooted in a number of basic hypothesis about 
how the economy works, which are frequently limited by data availability in terms of both 
scope and length. Some other formal methods commit to the avoidance of such robust 
theoretical constraints on the data, employing a vector autoregressive model in order to infer 
about the potential consequences of monetary policy. Leaving those types of approaches to 
future researchers, for a number of reasons that will be detailed further on in the inquiry, the 
one chosen for this work is that of conducting a less formal, descriptive, graphic and 
comparative exploration, which copes with inspections and comparisons of variables related 
to monetary transmission, aimed at making inferences boiling down to recommendations for 
stylized facts about monetary transmission (Ganev, Molnar, Rybiñski, & Wozniak, 2002). 
The ratio behind the comparative analysis of conventional and unconventional approaches of 
monetary policy is that the latter, aimed at altering the extent of the central bank balance sheet 
and, consequently, the liquidity position of credit institutions, may trigger a different response 
of economic agents in the two different stages of transmission and, therefore, imply, in line 
with the main objective of these kind of measures, a major degree of cross-country 
homogeneity. 
Given the key role that the credit channel and credit institutions play in relation to the scope 
of this work, a brief review of those potential sources which could counteract the transmission 




concluding the paragraph and moving to the exploration of the procedural approaches which 
have been attempted in the field, together the limits and barriers encountered. 
Table 4: Trojan Horses Affecting the Credit Channel 
Factors Interfering with the First Stage 
of the Bank Lending Channel 
Factors Interfering with the Second 
Stage of the Bank Lending Channel 
Multibank holding networks are 
propitious to the development of internal 
capital markets from which affiliated 
banks can profit even when external 
financing resources have dried up. 
Especially relevant for small banks, which 
would so manage to shield their lending 
activity from shocks (Ashcraft, 2001). 
A potential mitigation might occur if 
firms would be capable of protecting 
themselves from short-term shocks in 
bank or external borrowing via 
adjustments of capacity utilization, if 
financial restrictions were foreseen in 
advance (Wang, 2001). 
A banking system which is well 
capitalized overall may limit the 
efficiency of the bank capital channel. 
Other features of the banking system like 
relationship lending and the maturity 
structure of loans actually positively 
affect the magnitude of the pass-through. 
Weak agreement on which characteristics 
of credit institutions (size, liquidity, 
capitalization) matter the most. The 
second stage of the bank lending channel 
seems to be even more debated, as a 
number of researchers stressed the 
existence of a broad lending channel 
instead of a bank lending channel. 
A highly dense concentration in the 
banking sector would imply the lack of 
small banks. As large banks would then 
have an easier time accessing to 
alternative external funding, they may 
insulate their loan supply from monetary 
policy shocks (Adams & Amel, 2005). 
If small firms’ contribution to output is 
insignificant, or if only a minor share of 
(small) firms relies on bank lending, the 
aggregate impact of the bank lending 
channel will be minimal and therefore 
negligible. 
 
There is relevant interconnection between 
different channel of the transmission 
If the dissemination of small firms is 
asymmetric across sectors, consequently, 
the aftermath of monetary policy 




mechanism, namely the credit channel 
and the interest rate pass-through. 
heterogeneous across sectors (Tornell & 
Westermann, 2002). 
The government’s strict engagement in 
the banking sector either as an owner or 
via public guarantees can partially 
counterbalance the effects of monetary 
policy on lending activity of banks 
(Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Pagès, Sevestre, 
& Worms, 2001). 
 
Government involvement may also imply 
mitigated budget restrictions for firms. 
Especially important for the case of 
transition economies (Kornai, Maskin, & 
Roland, 2003). 
 
Source: (Ganev, Molnar, Rybiñski, & Wozniak, 2002). 
The following paragraph analyses a number of theoretical contributions that may prove to be 
helpful in relation to the objective of the work. Given the relevance of the credit channel and 
the pivotal role of banks in generating effectiveness asymmetries in the pass-through of 
monetary policy, the exploration will be centred on methods exploiting data at the micro 
level, which are generally said to be more suitable to capture bank-lending heterogeneity. The 
main problem associated with formal approaches built on macro, aggregate data, benefiting 
from small structural macroeconomic models with at most several equations, involving 
estimations of several equations, reaction functions, and doing simulations, is that they fail to 
consider the country-specific dimension of the individual bank, which actually appears to be 
one of the main conductors of monetary policy. The study of such entities, with their cross-
country differing characteristics, will be leading, throughout a number of paragraphs, to the 
final conclusion. 
 
3.2 Methodological approaches and related limits encountered by researchers on the 
topic 
Before delving into the detailed description of the empirical techniques which have been 
adopted by researchers and practitioners over years, revolving around the theoretical field of 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and its effectiveness, let’s briefly mention the 
reasons behind the choice of adopting a methodology centred on micro-data, coming from the 
balance sheets of credit institutions, which are, as described in the previous paragraph, at the 




The use of micro data by a stream of literature, even if not comparable with the extent of 
research adopting methods based on aggregate data, aimed at studying the transmission of 
monetary policy from the central monetary authority to individual credit institutions is 
motivated by the widespread conviction that macroeconomic time-series are not adequate to 
distinguish a credit channel from the more traditional money channel. Such belief is rooted in 
the assumption that the money channel functions through banks' liabilities, and the credit 
channel operates through their assets. But assets’ and liabilities’ items are tightly interrelated 
by accounting identities, thus modelling a concerning identification problem. For this reason, 
the evidence provided by macroeconomic research which look at output and price aggregates’ 
fluctuations in response to adjustments in the amounts of loans and deposits is rarely decisive. 
On the other hand, microeconomic data allow the more precision detection of the existence of 
a credit channel by testing the specific empirical implication of the credit view, namely the 
one of asymmetric banks’ (and firms’) reactions to a shift in monetary policy, according to 
their structural features. Small banks, for instance, face more complexities in sheltering their 
loans' structure from a squeeze in central bank liquidity because they typically cannot replace 
CD’s and interbank loans for deposits without costs. Other reasons for stating the weak 
adequacy of aggregate techniques for the scope of this works have to be researched in the 
following matters: 
1. The standard errors are often substantial, so that the hypothesis of symmetry can be 
easily rejected, even if the point estimates are very different across countries; 
2. The approximations obtained are not robust to the “Lucas critique” since they are 
normally based on samples from a pre-EMU monetary regime, inspired to previous 
studies, and one of the main consequences of the monetary union is exactly that of 
altering the way European monetary policy is conducted. The same may be valid for 
the emergence of unconventional measures; 
3. More significantly, the empirical evidence derived from such approaches on 
asymmetries in monetary transmission is silent to the question of which are the 
sources of the observed divergencies, thus furnishing no instructions for authorities 
who commit to their reduction,  (Favero, Giavazzi, & Flabbi, 1999).  
Let’s now turn to the exploration of that stream of international research that moves from 
banks’ balance sheets, whose items may be considered as proxies for some structural 
characteristics generating asymmetries across credit institutions, to analyse the efficacy of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy across Euro countries. The first and probably 




procedure in the identification of a monetary shock (which will be deepened further on in the 
dissertation) and the extreme simplification of the methodology just running a basic linear 
regression. Their empirical strategy was articulated in two steps: 
1. Recognition of an episode of synchronised shift in monetary policy. As an indicator of 
the extent of monetary policy they opted for a measure of bank liquidity: cash plus 
reserves. Looking at this variable, they managed to certificate an important shift in the 
supply of banks’ liquidity during 1992; 
2. Identification of the impact of the squeeze in liquidity on the supply of loans by 
individual banks: they managed to perform such an action by testing whether the 
observed asymmetries across banks are consistent with their structural features, 
namely size and strength of their balance sheet. 
Following this second step, just in 1992 the cause of a movement in reserves could be 
assigned to monetary policy: during that year opposite shifts in interest rates and reserves 
were detected, and output gaps did not show any relevant variation in the cycle. The authors 
decided not to exploit the panel dimension of the dataset, just to focus on a cross-section for 
the single year. They computed the strength of a bank balance sheet as (cash + securities + 
reserves)/ total assets, explicitly reflecting the concept that a balance sheet is strong when it is 
liquid, so allowing an individual bank to shield the supply of loans from fluctuations in the 
stance of monetary policy, leaving it untouched. On the other hand, size variables can include 
elements of the lending view that are not connected to the strength of the balance sheet: larger 
banks might have an easier time issuing a wide variety of market instruments (such as 
certificates of deposit) which can also function as protection for their lending activity from 
adjustments to monetary policy. Their use of reserves as variable, intended as a proxy for 
monetary policy shocks, will be detailed further on. Their results, commented country-by-
country, pointed at a weakly-significant heterogeneity among the four major countries chosen, 
namely Italy, France, Germany and Spain (Favero, Giavazzi, & Flabbi, 1999).  
Kashyap & Stein (1997) adopted a different strategy, only relying on a descriptive analysis, 
without running regressions, provide an insightful starting point for future empirical research. 
They inferred the degree of bank dependence in different countries by looking at the size 
distribution of firms and the availability of nonbank finance, so, differently from Favero et al. 
(1999) they focus on both stages of the credit channel, parallelly accounting for banks’ and 
firms’ reaction to monetary policy shocks. To assess loan supply effects, they studied the size 
distribution of the banking industry and the health of banks. They conducted such 




Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the UK. Such size distribution index for the supply side is represented by the three-
firm concentration ratio for commercial banks (that is, the share of total commercial bank 
assets controlled by the three largest commercial banks in the country). In Belgium, 
Netherlands, and the UK, the large banks appeared to hold a dominant position. Conversely, 
Italy, Germany, and Luxembourg were emphasized as countries in which the smaller banks 
tend to control a significant share of total assets. In addition to the information on bank size, 
they employed a number of measures of bank profitability and capital. The rationale behind 
such adoption is that well-capitalized (or highly rated) banks should be facing less difficulties 
going to securities markets to raise funds as a consequence of a deposit shock. Accordingly, 
monetary policy shall have a weaker impact when banks are well capitalized. Their 
benchmark measure of creditworthiness came from Thomson BankWatch rating software 
complemented with another measure of bank health (OECD stylized income statement for 
banks). Turning to the demand side of loans, bank dependence indexes for borrowers are 
based on unemployment and on the structure of capital markets across Europe (an ideal 
measure of the switching costs firms would suffer in case they lost their bank financing). To 
summarize the results of such descriptive analysis, they attributed each country a letter grade 
(from A to C) for each of our four factors. A grade of “A” indicates the minimum 
responsiveness to monetary policy. A mark has been assigned to all these features and then a 
final rate has been provided for each country based on subjective weighting of the following 
standards (Kashyap & Stein, 1997):  
• Relevance of small banks; 
• Bank health condition; 
• Importance of small firms; 
• Availability of non-bank finance. 
Linking to above-explained descriptive analysis, de Bondt (1998) employed the external 
finance premium as a proxy (that is, the cost spread between external and self-finance) for 
banks’ lending activity. The author ran a basic interactive regression with bank loans as a 
dependent variable (100 * net loans/total assets) and short-term interests rate, liquidity (100 * 
liquid assets/deposits and money market funding), size (ln of total assets) and real GDP 
growth expressed in percentage as explanatory variables. Data were taken from the 
BankScope database, with unbalanced observation for six European countries (Italy, 




existence of credit channels, both considering lending channels and balance sheet channels, 
with different intensity across countries (de Bondt, 1998). Among various papers mentioned 
by the latter while describing the potency of credit channels across various European 
countries, Angeloni et al. (1995) demonstrated that Italy has traditionally been characterized 
by one of the strongest, for a number of reasons: the weak degree of progress of the stock and 
private bond markets; the virtual non-existence of commercial paper; the high fragmentation 
and structural asymmetry among credit institutions; the low extent of international credit 
market integration, mainly caused by the high fiscal and reserve burdens imposed on domestic 
banks; the high interest elasticity of money demand, which implies that monetary policy 
exerts a vigorous influence on the size of banks’ balance sheets. The empirical approach was 
based on clusters of credit institutions, according to many relevant features:  
• Large vs. small banks, depending on the total size of their loan portfolio;  
• Large vs. small average loan banks, according to the average volume of their loans.  
Information on the characteristics of the firms borrowing from the bank groups were derived 
from “Centrale dei Bilanci”. In order to assess the dynamic response of bank interest rates, 
and thus of their lending activity, in a more systematic way, they approximated a VAR model 
on monthly data, separately for the two groups. Large banks, and particularly "large average 
loan" banks, responded more rapidly to monetary policy stimuli than counterparts. Their 
findings resulted to be contradictory with respect to standard results because of the positive 
reaction of rate differentials to monetary, inconsistently with the traditional assumption of the 
credit view that smaller banks face difficulties in isolating themselves from monetary policy 
shocks through asset and liability management. This asymmetry was demonstrated to be 
connected to two structural characteristics of the credit market namely customer relationships 
and monopoly power in local markets (Angeloni, Buttiglione, Ferri, & Gaiotti, 1995). 
Again De Bondt (1999), in another relevant work, adopted two credit supply factors to test the 
relative importance of the two stages of the credit channel, respectively banks' holdings of 
securities for bank lending channel and net wealth of households and firms for the balance 
sheet channel. Loan demand effects were assumed to be proxied by real gross domestic 
product (GDP). Its main empirical findings might be summarized as follows: credit to 
households is more reactive to a squeeze in monetary policy than credit to firms; the response 
was demonstrated to be wider in Germany and Italy, thus furnishing strong evidence for the 
existence of credit channels of monetary policy. The statistical technique implemented was 
once more that of VECM, a vector autoregressive model (VAR) (De Bondt , 1999). The 




transmission mechanism has also been adopted as explanatory variables in the work by 
Chatelain et al. (2003). They measured size as the logarithm of total assets. Liquidity was 
estimated as the ratio of liquid assets (cash, interbank lending and securities) to total assets, 
and capitalization was approximated by the ratio of capital and reserves to total assets. The 
empirical technique was computed with each of the bank features in turn, as well as once with 
all three characteristics simultaneously. The results might be summarized with the finding that 
restrictive monetary policy reduces bank lending of the average bank. The responsiveness of 
credit institutions varies across countries, size does not appear to be a helpful indicator for the 
distributional effects of monetary policy. Furthermore, even capitalization variables do not 
play a major role in distinguishing banks’ reactions. Only liquidity resembles to be 
significant: more liquid banks reduce loans to a lesser extent in response to a restrictive 
monetary policy than less liquid banks tend to do (Chatelain, et al., 2003). Brimmis & Delis 
(2010), on the other hand, opted for the employment of market power as internal factor 
influencing banks’ reaction in terms of lending and risk-taking to monetary policy impulses 
instead of considering a measure of size, and the reasons have already been presented 
throughout the course of chapter number two. They employed a smoothing technique, and in 
particular the Local GMM (LGMM) method, using a micro-dataset from BankScope 
(Brimmis & Delis, 2010).  
Kishan & Opiela (2000) furnished proof of the existence of both a credit channel and a bank 
lending channel of monetary policy in the United States from 1980 to 1995. They tested for 
bank loan supply shifts by clustering banks depending on asset size and capital leverage ratio 
(Kishan & Opiela, 2000). Adapting the same methodology to Europe, Altubas et al. (2002) 
ranked banks according to asset size and capital strength to test whether these factors exerted 
a significant impact on the lending channel. Using a panel data approach, they discovered that, 
across the EMU system, undercapitalised banks (of any size) tend to react more to 
modifications in policy. When checking the individual country approximations for France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, evidence of a bank lending channel exists only with regard to the 
last two countries. By logic consequence, it may appear that the bank lending channel prevails 
for undercapitalised banks operating in the other smaller EMU members. Exploiting 
individual bank level data, the growth in bank loans is regressed on the current period and 
lagged values of changes in the relevant countries short-term money market rate, current and 
lagged growth in bank securities holdings, current and lagged growth in interbank deposits,  
current and lagged growth in GDP and lagged change in bank lending. As a representative of 
monetary policy stance, they opted for short-term money market rates. Their empirical 




1. They first tested the reaction of total loans, securities, total deposits and interbank 
borrowings to changes in the short-term money market using the full pooled sample; 
2. Then they examined the bank lending channel using the bundled approximations 
depending on the six asset size categories; 
3. Afterwards, they checked the modalities through which the funding characteristics of 
different sizes of banks reacted to policy shocks; 
4. Finally, they analysed the estimations of the lending channel according to bank size 
and capital strength (here the number of asset size categories was reduced to 3 because 
of missing data).  
Among the chosen asset categories which can be enumerated there were: total assets, total 
loans, total securities, total deposits, total interbank deposits (Altunbas, Fazylov, & 
Molyneux, 2002). Definitely, they provided stronger evidence of the existence of a bank 
lending channel in Europe than Favero et al. (1999), but poorer than De Bondt (1999). 
The three additional empirical contributions that are to be mentioned below belongs to the 
aftermath of the financial turmoil and may, therefore, contain precious insights related to the 
scope of this work, that is to check the presumed improved homogeneity of the transmission 
mechanism subsequent to the implementation of balance sheet policies, aimed precisely at 
altering the liquidity position of credit institutions, which in turn may modify their response to 
the monetary shocks. Holton & Rodriguez D’Acri (2015) contributed to the identification of 
those balance sheet characteristics that played a major role in the fragmentation of the 
transmission of monetary policy after the financial crisis. Their analysis drew on a dataset 
gathered by the European Central Bank (ECB) composed individual balance sheet items from 
a sample of monetary and financial institutions (MFIs), relative to a five-years period (from 
mid-2007 to mid-2012). As econometric technique, they employed single equation 
generalised error correction model (ECM), considering the interest rates on new loans with a 
short fixation period (up to 1 year), as dependent variables. As explanatory variables, on the 
other hand, they opted for money market rates, which are picked by policymakers as 
objectives and typically influence banks’ cost of funds (EONIA). The relevant bank 
characteristics for the analysis were, as normally assumed in literature: bank size, liquidity 
and capital. The size variable was designed as the ratio of main assets of a bank over the total 
assets of the respective country; bank liquidity was described and computed as the addition of 
the most liquid assets over main assets. Their work provided demonstration that SMEs 




financial turmoil, possibly because they have fewer external financing alternative options and 
so are obliged to bear higher interest rates (Holton & Rodriguez D'Acri, 2015). Altavilla et al. 
(2016) proved that bank balance sheet items such as the capital ratio and the exposure to 
sovereign debt are the major responsible for the heterogeneity in the transmission of 
conventional monetary policies, whereas the location of a bank is insignificant. The main role 
of non-standard measures was related to the normalization of the capacity of banks to grant 
loans, which in turn leads to a significant reduction of lending rates. The dataset they drew on  
Individual Monetary and Financial Institution Interest Rates or IMIR ( composed of 
information on individual deposits and lending rates charged by banks for different maturities 
and for different loan sizes) and Individual Balance Sheet Indicators, or IBSI, (reporting the 
main asset and liability items of over 260 banks resident in the euro area from July 2007 to 
December 2015). Their econometric approach was based on cross-sectional Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model, executed in two steps: in the first they exploited the time series 
dimension of the data, bank by bank, to approximate the dynamic response of lending rates to 
policy stimuli. In a second step, they classified the distribution of pass-throughs estimated 
according to bank-specific characteristics and computed the average gap between the upper 
and lower quartiles of the distribution. The bank characteristics which have been accounted 
for were (Altavilla, Canova, & Ciccarelli, 2016): 
1. The exposure to domestic sovereign bonds; 
2. The capital ratio; 
3. The degree of stability of the funding structure, as proxied by the ratio between total 
loans and total deposits; 
4. The share of non-performing loans as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. 
Finally, concluding the series of works which have been deemed to be worthwhile 
mentioning, Ciccarelli et al. (2013) contributed a significant evidence theorizing that the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel has been partly soften, particularly during the 2010-
2011 period, by means of the policy actions. With the provision of heightened liquidity 
through the full allotment policy and the Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), the 
central bank managed to diminish the costs arising to banks from the limitations to private 
liquidity funding, through the induction of a softening in lending conditions. Their empirical 
approach was not centred on the use of micro-data, however the result could be interesting for 
the purpose, as they argued that the bank balance sheet problems might have been partly 




have targeted almost exclusively banks’ liquidity, while the non-financial borrower balance 
sheet channel maintained its significance, especially in the context of financially distressed 
countries. Moreover, thanks to the macro-analysis they performed, they highlighted how the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy has changed with the crisis, with a strong 
amplification effect of the credit channel in countries experiencing sovereign stress 
(Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, & Peydrò, 2013). 
Focusing now on the methodology chosen for the purpose of investigating the research 
question, namely to test whether a shift in the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, through the intermediation of banks as main actors in the chain, has 
occurred in the last decade, characterized by the outbreak and spread of unconventional 
monetary approaches in response to the financial turmoil, which has counteracted the 
efficiency of traditional measures. For a number of reasons detailed before, credit institutions 
have been chosen as the main subject to be studied, for the crucial role they play in altering 
the effectiveness of monetary policy’s impact across countries, depending on the extent of 
their structural characteristics. For this cause, the optimal methodology would have been to 
perform a linear empirical analysis based on panel-data from banks’ balance sheet coming 
from a number of Euro members, in order to assess the cross-country dimension of their 
response to both types of monetary shocks, checking whether and to what extent some 
divergencies occurred. The main advantages of using micro-approaches, instead of 
methodologies accounting for aggregate macro-data, have been outlined so far. Nevertheless, 
these benefits do not come without costs, in particular this type of technique, studying banks’ 
behaviour, only allows to concentrate on the first step of transmission of the credit channel, 
ignoring the response of firms and individual consumers, which constitute the second and 
more debated stage of the mechanism. These insights will be taken into account for the 
concluding paragraph, intend to provide a direction for future research on the topic.   
Unfortunately many complexities arose in how to find the suitable data set, including balance 
sheet items from banks homogeneously distributed over a relevant number of Euro-area 
members, for a significant span of time (that is, one containing the period of financial crisis, 
assuming, for example, a year as discontinuity point between conventional and 
unconventional measures). As a result, a second-best solution has been looked for. The idea 
would have been that of applying the same intended linear regression to Italy, with the aim of 
theoretically extending the results to the Euro-area as a whole. Again, some complications 
occurred with regard to the dataset. The available database for the selected country, Aida, 




banks and other financial institutions operating in Italy. A potential dataset composed of 633 
banks across all the Italian regions has been imported from the database. In order to carry out 
such an empirical analysis, the necessary data were those on loan quantities per year (as 
explanatory variable) and on liquidity, capital and size measure as explanatory variables, 
following the approaches implemented by international researchers on the topic. No official 
statistics were available for a significant span of time (years which were intended to be 
considered ranged from 2009 to 2018, assuming 2014 as stepping-stone for the adoption of 
unconventional policies). Moreover, most of the measures which could have represented a 
proxy for size, like total revenues or the number of employees, were not available on a time-
series dimensions, whereas data on total assets were accessible only for the 2013-2018 time 
span, even with many missing data. Capitalization information were available just in the form 
of “Current capitalization”, not much adequate, and still there were plenty of missing data. 
Evidence on liquidity (after having checked current assets, cash, deposits and liquidity index 
measures) were totally absent in the dataset, almost entirely constituted of missing data. The 
variable intended to be explained by the empirical analysis as dependent, namely loans, might 
have been proxied by the “Credits towards clients” item of the balance sheet (long-term 
credits), but, unfortunately, again the dataset was nearly lacking.  
Given all these obstacles, the obliged choice was that of providing an in-depth literature 
overview on the topic, highlighting those which can be considered as suitable starting point 
for future research, with suggested suitable empirical methodologies. With respect to the 
research question, that will be explored by means of some aggregate statistics which, coupled 
with more systematic existing international research, may furnish a visual and intuitive 
answer of how banks’ behaviour, and therefore the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, has evolved in recent years. 
 
3.3 The lending channel for conventional and unconventional measures: comparative 
overview and stylized facts 
The function of this crucial paragraph of the work is mainly instrumental to the further 
discussion of the key findings. Before progressing and concluding the inquiry on the topic, 
which has been conducted throughout the path of the research work, a descriptive 
comparative overview of the main points of difference between the bank lending channels of 
the two types of monetary measures which have been adopted in the last decades will be 
provided. This goal will be accomplished through a schematic and intuitive narrative 




The importance of analysing the bank-lending channel for unconventional monetary policy 
measures, as opposed to conventional ones, is related to different motivations, which are 
mainly rooted in the nature of such kind of intervention. Unconventional operations are 
typically embarked on in a context of serious market distress and when functioning of 
conventional policy mechanisms are considered seriously compromised; encouraging lending 
supply in banks is, in most cases, the main declared target of these policies. In this context,  
the traditional empirical assumptions of the bank lending channel are likely to be voided, or 
insignificant (Albertazzi, Nobili, & Signoretti, 2016). The principal conjecture that 
presumably would be reversed is the standard one, formulated by the orthodox literature on 
the bank lending channel, foreseeing the more powerful transmission for less capitalized 
banks, which are more susceptible to asymmetric information concerns (Kishan & Opiela, 
2000) (Jayaratne & Morgan, 2000). However, in times of financial disorder, weakly-
capitalized banks may be less effective in enlarging credit supply when reacting to an 
expansionary policy due, for example, to an exacerbated pressure from the markets or from 
regulators. Dissimilarly, in times of routine, banks that are more dependent on market funding  
have usually been shown to be better insulated from monetary policy shocks (Van den 
Heuvel, 2002) (Romer & Romer, 1990).  
Table 5: Comparative overview of the bank lending channel for conventional and 
unconventional policies 









Commonly correlated with a 
steepening of the yield curve 
and an expansion in the banks’ 
net interest income (bank 
capital channel) (Albertazzi, 
Nobili, & Signoretti, 2016). 
Associated with a flattening of the 
yield-curve, which erodes future 
profitability via net interest income 
reduction (reverse bank capital 





the holding of 
sovereign bonds 
 
Wide sovereign portfolios are 
generally intertwined with an 
extremely liquid balance-sheet 
and thus with a weak 
As a consequence of UMP, 
implying increases in the market 
value of bonds, banks with high 
sovereign exposure realize large 
capital gains enabling them to 




transmission via the BLC 
(Kashyap & Stein, 2000). 










Monetary policy transmission is 
more intense for credit 
institutions with weak balance 
sheets, as are they are said to be 
more vulnerable to problems of 
unequal information (Kashyap 
& Stein, 1995) (Stein, 1998). 
Debated question: findings 
according which monetary policy 
stimuli are conveyed to a greater 
extent by banks with robust capital 
and funding positions, pointing 
towards a key role of regulatory 
and economic constraints 











Contrary to the asymmetric 
information case, this foresees 
the major strength in monetary 
policy transmission for more 
capitalized banks and, 
potentially, for banks with more 
consolidated funding structures 
(Bernanke & Lown, 1991) (Van 
den Heuvel, 2002). 
 
Disproportionate normative and 
supervisory pressure on the extent 
of allowed bank capitalization may 
water down the effectiveness of 
UMP by increasing the (concrete 
or presumed) barriers for of banks’ 
ability to expand credit supply 








The lack of substantial liquidity 
effects in the short period 
signals the existence of a well-
functioning credit multiplier, 
which enables the grant of new 
loans. Stronger risk-taking 
channel (Peersman, 2011). 
 
The credit multiplier results to be 
significantly mitigated for a rise in 
bank lending generated by balance 
sheet innovations. The evidence 
points towards a weaker risk-
taking channel (Adrian & Shin, 







effects on the 
economy 
The implications on the real 
economy and consumer prices 
reach a peak after about one 
year. The increment in target 
variables occurs almost 
immediately after an interest 
rate shock (Peersman, 2011). 
An equivalent approach takes 
about six months more in the 
eventuality of innovations to the 
monetary base. The 
unconventional bank lending 
channel turns out to be more 
sluggish (Peersman, 2011). 
 
The comparative overview, provided above, which has been developed through an in-depth 
literature analysis, allows to check the modalities through which the differing features of 
conventional and unconventional measures of monetary policy impact the effectiveness of the 
bank lending channel. For this reason, it certainly proves to be central for the conclusive 
discussion of the formulate hypotheses. From what argued up to this point of the inquiry, it 
may be inferred that the forced shift to unconventional policies represented a cornerstone in 
the analysis of the transmission mechanism functioning. Through the study of banks’ 
behaviour, it has been possible to grasp the ways in which they have been able to alter its 
effectiveness on each country member individually, as well as at a macro level.  
Postponing a more structured and systematic discussion to the following paragraph, let’s now 
explore some stylized facts extracted from the official statistics stored in the publicly 
accessible ECB database. This step will allow to provide an aggregate approximation of how 
credit institutions have behaved in relation to credit activity over the past two decades, from a 
single-state perspective in order to allow some cross-country comparisons. A series of charts 
will be presented, relative to four main EMU members, namely Italy (blue line), France (red 
line), Germany (pink line) and Spain (green line). The time span considered is a twenty-years 
period (the initial two decades of the 21st century), to better grasp the shift occurred almost at 
the half of the interval. Aggregate statistics would have been available for many other 
member states, as well as for the Euro area aggregately; anyway, the choice of analysing only 
that four regions aims at aligning with most of the international literature explored so far, 
which would have guided also the design and implementation of that potential empirical 
analysis which has been described in the previous paragraph. The first variable explored is 






Figure 7: Growth rates of total loans to households and corporates 
 
Monetary financial institution balance sheet statistics (2000-2020 time span) respectively for Italy (blue line), France (red line), Germany 
(pink line) and Spain (green line), growth rates of total loans to euro area households and non-financial corporations (all currencies 
combined, all maturities, not seasonally adjusted, annual percentage changes) 
Source: (European Central Bank, 2020). 
These charts show respectively, the growth of lending rates trends (2000-2020-time span) for 
two relevant categories of borrowers, namely euro area households and corporations (all 
currencies combined, all maturities, not seasonally adjusted, annual percentage changes). 
What can be easily noted is the flattening and the normalization of the four growth rate trends 
around a lower value with respect to previous years. This inferred conclusion appears to be in 
line with the extent of the existing literature on the bank lending channel, consistent with a 
slight reduction of lending rates, and with the main assumptions and hypotheses formulated in 
this work. Considering year 2008/2009 as the cornerstone, reference year for switch from 
conventional to unconventional monetary measures, it might be deducted, observing the 
official statistics, that more homogeneity in the distributive effectiveness of the bank lending 
channel, which reflects the behaviour of credit institutions, has been achieved with the 
intervention of monetary policy authorities.  
Other insightful stylized facts refer to the loan-to-deposits variable, that might better portray 
the effectiveness of monetary authorities’ intervention in relation to the scope of this work, as 
this index represents and accurate proxy for a bank’s level of liquidity. In particular, if the 
ratio is too high, it means that the bank may not have enough liquidity to cover any 
unforeseen fund requirements. Conversely, if the ratio is too low, the bank may not be earning 
as much as it could be. It definitely shows a bank's ability to cover loan losses and 
withdrawals by its customers (Murphy, 2020). Of course, one could imagine the lack of 




such index in relation to the explored international literature on the topic: liquidity has been 
deemed, by most of the researchers who has been mentioned up to now, as one of the main 
factors undermining the unambiguous distribution of the effects of a policy implemented by 
the central bank. What the chart represents is a synthesis of monetary financial institution 
balance sheet statistics, involving the ratio between total loans and total deposits vis-a-vis 
euro area non-financial corporations and households and non-euro area non-financial 
corporations, households and non-bank financial institutions (excluding general government, 
all currency combined, all maturities, not seasonally adjusted, percentage, quarterly). 
Figure 8: Loan-to-deposit ratio 2000-2020 trend 
 
Monetary financial institution balance sheet statistics (2000-2020 time span) ) respectively for Italy (blue line), France (red line), Germany 
(pink line) and Spain (green line), ratio between total loans and total deposits vis-a-vis euro area non-financial corporations and households 
and non-euro area non-financial corporations, households and non-bank financial institutions (excluding general government, all currency 
combined, all maturities, not seasonally adjusted, percentage, quarterly) 
Source: (European Central Bank, 2020) 
The main outcome that might be reasonably inferred from such graph relates that sort of 
convergence which have been theorized by many practitioners and researchers of lending 
condition across Europe. Again, considering 2008 as main point of refence for the very first 
adoption of unconventional policies, it appears that the employment and iterative 
implementation of such policies prompted a trend towards homogeneity in liquidity 
conditions among credit institutions, which, by hypothesis, may improve homogeneity in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Before concluding the paragraph, it might be worthwhile to show, through an aggregate 
perspective, a schematic representation of how the European geography of bank lending 
activity currently works. The following map, with the attached caption, shows how the loan-





Figure 9: Loan-to-deposit ratio: an aggregate perspective 
 
Source: (European Central Bank, 2020) 
The following key paragraph of the inquiry will aim to aggregate all the evidences provided 
up to this point, integrating them with the comparative overview and the insights gained from 
the statistics observation, in order to draw some final conclusion and discuss further future 
potential developments. 
 
3.4 Results discussion 
A number of helpful theoretical and empirical contributions from international researchers 
and practitioners have been analysed so far, allowing the discussion of some results which 
have been derived from a detailed conceptual exploration and aggregation of the main points 
of interest. Postponing the recommendation of a particular direction for future research on the 
topic to the following and conclusive paragraph of the dissertation, the main points of the 
theory underlying the scope of such work will be here summarized and bundled, in order to 
provide some final concluding remarks. 
The discussion revolved around the main macro-topic of the bank-lending, or credit, channel, 




main simplifying limitation of sharp two-asset dichotomy that underlies the traditional model, 
it gave rise to a wide stream of literature built on the assumption that there are three important 
asset types: money, bonds, and bank loans (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). Unlike the traditional 
theory, that stresses the relevance of households’ preferences between money and other less 
liquid assets, the new theory of monetary policy asserts that the role of the banking sector is 
central to the transmission of monetary policy. Specifically, two key factors shape the way in 
which monetary policy works, reflecting, respectively, the first and the second stage of the 
bank-lending channel (Kashyap & Stein, 1997):  
1. The degree to which banks rely on reservable deposit financing and adjust their loan 
supply schedules following changes in bank reserves; 
2. The degree to which certain borrowers are bank-dependent and cannot easily offset 
these shifts in bank loan supply. 
In the context of this work, the focus has mainly been directed towards the first stage of the 
channel, while the second one, involving consumer behaviours, has traditionally been more 
debated because of the intrinsic complexities in analysing it. The major implication of the 
credit channel which has been deemed to be relevant for the scope of this inquiry is that credit 
institutions have been demonstrated, both empirically and theoretically, to respond differently 
to monetary policy shocks, designed and implemented by the central bank, according to some 
of their structural characteristics. The main features which have been researched as 
distinguishing variables for the differing reaction of bank to monetary stimuli are, 
respectively: size and capitalization, both related to the concept of “strength” of the selected 
credit institution, and liquidity, based on the bank’s ability to buffer from external shock using 
excess liquidity as a shield. 
The second theoretical argument central to the logic development of the thesis is that of cross-
country heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism, widely explored across chapter number 
two. Such an issue has been the main target of many researchers and practitioners over the last 
decades: the concern of monetary policy having asymmetric distributional effects on different 
countries has been a main concern since the period prior to the EMU establishment, to the 
more recent times of financial turmoil, when, from a normative point of view, knowing in 
advance how the effects of monetary authorities’ intervention would have been distributed 
across the members of the monetary union could have been of great utility to policymakers. 
From country-specific structural characteristics to issues of international economics which 
can influence the geography of the distributional effects of monetary policy, the attention has 




bank-lending channel mentioned above: depending on those bank’s characteristics, which are 
also affected by countries’ regulatory and legal systems, credit institutions in various member 
states would grant loans up to different amounts. 
Turning to the main hypothesis of the thesis, the aim was that of questioning, through an in-
depth literature exploration, coupled with the observation of a number of official ECB 
statistics, the possibility and eventual direction of a gradual shift in the effectiveness of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, concurrently with the employment of 
unconventional approaches in response to the extraordinary economic conditions generated by 
the financial crisis. Additionally, even if not adopting empirical techniques for a number of 
reasons detailed earlier on, some approximation of the dynamics which distinguish 
conventional and unconventional shocks have been shown, in order to provide more accurate 
conclusions. The key link between the main topics explained up to this point is represented by 
the bank-lending channel, particularly by its first stage (considering also the second one 
would imply much more complexity). A wide array of researchers, mentioned throughout the 
inquiry, has investigated, at the micro-level, the various banks’ balance sheet characteristics 
that affect the response of credit institutions to central stimuli: it seems reasonable to adopt 
the same methodology, that is analysis of banks’ balance sheets, to assess the effectiveness of 
measures that explicitly targeted the levels of banks’ liquidity (which is also one of the most 
cited features causing heterogeneous banks’ reactions).  
Many applicative divergencies between the two categories of approach to monetary policy 
have been detected through the comparative overview performed in table n.4, which detected 
the following points of divergency:  
• Different consequences on banks’ future capital position and profitability; 
• Implications of the holding of sovereign bonds; 
• Degree of information asymmetry between banks and investors; 
• Presence of capital or funding constraints, such as regulatory requirements or market 
pressure; 
• Potency of the risk-taking channel; 
• Duration and persistence of the effects on the economy. 
These factors appear to have an opposite influence on the effectiveness of conventional and 




clearly manifest, as they shall be necessarily kept in mind by policymakers wishing to 
positively affect the economy, in the design and implementation of monetary measures. 
One of the more ambitious estimations which has been provided during the course of the 
work is that of improved cross-country homogeneity subsequent to the progressive 
configuration and roll-out of balance sheet innovations. No significant studies have been 
found, empirically nor theoretically investigating such concerning question. Logically 
reasoning, the nature itself of unconventional policies, whose aim is the harmonization of 
banks’ behaviour targeting their level of liquidity, shall imply that, if they are to be 
successful, they shall improve the distributional effectiveness of the bank lending channel, 
pointing to enhanced equity.  
Before explicitly listing the conclusion of the inquiry, it might be worthwhile to mention the 
results achieved by Kashyap and Stein (1997) in their descriptive research work described 
across this chapter. The point of major interest they reached in their conclusion is represented 
by an approximation of the bank-lending channel potency for a number of EMU member 
countries, proxied by a grade from, A to C, corresponding to progressive responsiveness of 
banks to monetary policy shocks. Their results were summarized in a table, reported below, 
which highlights how different factors, mentioned also by many other practitioners in the 
field, contributed to affecting the intensity of the bank-lending channel 















Belgium A B B A A/B 
Denmark B B B A B 
France B C B B B/C 
Germany C B A B B 
Greece B B C C B/C 
Ireland B B B B B 
Italy B C C C C- 
Luxembourg C A A B B 
Netherlands A A C B A/B 




Spain B B C B B 
UK A A A A A 
 
Each country has been assigned a letter grade (from A to C) for each of the four chosen factors. A grade of “A” reflects the 
minimum sensitivity to monetary policy; “C” indicates high responsiveness. Finally, an aggregate grade (shown in the last 
column), based on a subjective weighting of the factors, has been determined. 
 
 
Source: (Kashyap & Stein, 1997). 
What can be relevant for the scope of this thesis is to highlight how the forced shift to 
unconventional ways of designing and implementing monetary policy may impact the overall 
predicted potency of the lending channel. With regard to “Bank health”, item which refers to 
the strength of a bank’s balance sheet, that is the extent to which it can use its surplus in 
liquidity to buffer against external shocks, it would result in a reduced level of sensitivity of 
the bank-lending channel. One could logically imagine that, with the gradual onset of 
unorthodox policies, in the eventuality they were successful, a major harmonization of 
lending standards would have been achieved,  potentially leading to a more uniform grade 
“A” for many of the countries considered. The same could be valid also with respect to 
“Importance of small banks”, whose liquidity position would have been enhanced with the 
major involvement of central authorities, offsetting size disadvantages that are normally 
predicted, allowing small banks to access valuable sources of funding. The second stage of 
the lending channel would need to be tackled more precisely, given the lesser extent of 
literature on the topic, both theoretically and empirically. Definitely, the overall potency of 
the lending channel shall result to be uniformly decreased across the various EMU countries, 
reflected in a generalized tendency towards an “A” rank, which would, anyway, lead to a 
more homogeneous aggregate result. Further econometric techniques would be suggested for 
investigating more precisely, from a micro point of view, how the different balance sheet 
items affect lending activity in the sample of country considered, providing a more precise 
spectrum of conventional versus unconventional policies’ functioning.  
 
3.5 Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research 
After having discussed the dynamics behind the main findings of this work, which is just to 
be completed, a schematic description of the conclusion that have been reached, moving from 




1. First of all, the more intuitive conclusion moves from the hypothesis of an 
effectiveness differential caused by the switch to unconventional measures of 
monetary policy. The answer, in this case, has easily been inferred from an in-dept 
literature exploration, widely documented by empirical evidence. The focus on the 
bank-lending channel of the transmission mechanism allowed to tighten the focus, 
given the perspective of further research on the topic, as well as to concentrate on 
banks, considered as key agents for the transmission of unconventional measures. 
Definitely, unconventional measures tend to favour the harmonization of lending 
activity across banks of various sizes and strength, as well as throughout countries, 
reducing its intensity and endurance, together with other factors listed in table n. 4; 
2. The question of cross-country heterogeneity, with its determinants, has been tackled 
from many perspectives, deepened across chapter number two. Again, the topic has 
been largely explored from researchers applying empirical techniques and extracting 
helpful insights, despite the absence of a full consensus. What still lacks, in this field, 
is an integrated framework for studying it in relation to the types of monetary measure 
adopted. Focusing again on the bank lending channel, a sort of agreement, across 
researchers and practitioners, exists on the structural features of banks contributing to 
asymmetries between banks, as well as across EMU members, that are, respectively, 
related to banks’ size, strength and liquidity, as inferred from their balance sheet 
items. With regard to the just-mentioned hypothesis, this study seeks to predict an 
improved degree of uniformity across countries in the response of the relative credit 
institutions to unconventional monetary shocks, compared to traditional interest rate 
innovations; 
3. An unexplored field of research, strictly connected to the topics just described, might 
be represented by the study of the way banks’ balance sheet items and structural 
characteristics, traditionally influencing the bank lending channel, have been altered 
by the progressive emergence of unorthodox measures of monetary policy. The 
predictions that have been formulated throughout this work, thanks also to the stylized 
facts analysed in paragraph 3.3, are limited to the emphasized reduced role of 
liquidity, whose harmonization has been explicitly targeted by central authorities in 
the design of balance sheet innovations. Definitely, the transmission mechanism of 
unconventional policies, via the bank-lending channel, shall result to be diminished in 
its potency and more homogeneous in its distributional effectiveness across countries, 




have included also banks’ strength and size characteristics, as inferred from their 
balance sheet. Generalizing, the same findings, moving from the same rationale, might 
be extended also to such other items, traditionally described as factors affecting 
interest rate innovations. 
The conclusions of this work, that is almost to be completed, are far from being exhaustive. 
For this reason, some suggestions, helpful for guiding future streams of research, will be 
provided. The natural continuation of this work would be that of empirically testing the main 
hypothesis and verify whether the theoretical prediction steaming therefrom were accurate in 
their essence. To do so, the employment of a balanced dataset of banks from a consistent 
number of EMU countries (or, at least, from the major ones, reducing complexity of the 
analysis, but loosing relevance of the results) would be necessary, in order to grasp significant 
cross-country implications. Alternatively, in case of lacking of suitable database, the micro-
analysis might be conducted on a sample of banks from a single country (better one of the 
most influent EMU members, which might more likely resemble the Union as a whole) in 
order to extend the results to the entire Euro-area. The main advantages of adopting 
methodologies based on micro steaming from banks’ balance sheet items, compared to 
approaches centred on the use of aggregate data at country-level, have been exposed 
throughout the course of this chapter. A crucial phase in the analysis would be that of 
distinguishing among conventional and non-conventional shocks, in order to draw a clear 
demarcation line between the two.  
Connected to this concern, it might be worthwhile to mention the approach adopted by Favero 
et al. (1999), who focused their attention on the market for bank reserves, the one where the 
central bank intervenes directly. In the attempt of schematically represent its functioning, it 
might be said that:  
• The behaviour of the demand function is settled by the way banks operate. It is 
negatively sloped, as the demand for reserves is dependent on the amount of bank 
deposits, which, in turn, are negatively in function of the opportunity cost of retaining 
money; 
• The supply function is, instead, piecewise, as it is composed of two flat segments and 
a perpendicular one. The interest rates on the two standing facilities stand for a 
minimum and a maximum threshold to the overnight rate. Banks are allowed to store 
funds with the central banks at the deposit rate, imin, and borrow cash from the central 
bank at the marginal rate, imax. As a result, the overnight rate cannot be inferior than 




rate: actually, it varies across a defined interval. The upward sloping portion of the 
supply function results to be vertical, consistently with a central bank that settles the 
amount of bank reserves through open market operations, independently from the 
overnight rate. 
Figure 10: The market for bank reserves in Europe 
 
Source (Favero, Giavazzi, & Flabbi, 1999). 
Thanks to this theoretical background, the authors managed to attribute two shifts in real 
interest rates to monetary policy measures just observing fluctuations in reserves and coupling 
them with interest rates and output gaps movements (Favero, Giavazzi, & Flabbi, 1999).  
Additionally, an alternative method which can be adopted to distinguish between standard and 
non-standard monetary shocks is the oversimplified one of assuming one year as unique 
divide between the application of the two types of measures; it would be, then, easy to verify 
the differences among the two sub-periods. Furthermore, in order to add a degree of 
sophistication, it might be possible, if deemed feasible, to integrate the results from the 
analysis at the micro-level, based on the response of banks proxied by its balance sheet items, 
with some findings inferred from the implementation of more complex econometric 
techniques, like vector autoregressive models or macroeconomic frameworks involving 
several equations, which works at a country-wide level. These methodological approaches 
would allow to more precisely validate the findings of previous analyses and, at the same 
time, to check the existence and potential influence of additional factors, other than banks’ 
features on the results. Such source of disturbance for the results might be researched in 




differences, or legal and bureaucratic constraints that might be visible only at the aggregate 
level.  
In conclusion, the normative importance, from the perspective of central authorities, of 
gaining some insights on the functioning of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, 
especially after the innovated procedural approach subsequent the period of financial turmoil, 
has been highlighted several times. This work aimed, using a mainly descriptive approach, at 
shedding some light on the theoretical issues behind such concerns and at providing a starting 
point for future researchers wishing to improve the effectiveness and distributional equity of 
the European Central Bank interventions, coupled with a substantial consciousness of the 






The path of this work, which is almost to be completed, has followed a logical approach 
starting the exploration of conventional and unconventional measures of monetary policy 
across the first chapter. Such investigation has been conducted from various perspectives, 
from a purely historical one, aimed at grasping the dramatic consequences of the forced shift 
to non-standard policies as a result of the financial crisis, to a more practical one, intended to 
shed more light on the applicative differences, as well as on the transmission mechanisms, of 
both types of measures. The concern, that has been the central topic of various streams of 
research over the last decades, of the potential inter-country asymmetries existing in the Euro 
area with regard to the effectiveness of monetary policy, has been tackled over the course of 
the second chapter of the inquiry. A number of researched causes for such issue have been 
analysed, belonging again to different historical periods of the last three decades: both 
structural, country-specific and international dynamics, as well as institutional and regulatory 
constraints, have been found to play a role in exacerbating the existing divergencies in the 
effectiveness of the monetary pass-through to the real economy. A particular focus has then 
been dedicated to the bank lending channel of the transmission mechanism, particularly 
relevant for explaining such effectiveness heterogeneity. The third chapter aimed at 
combining the preceding ones in terms of questioning whether the bank lending channel has 
been experiencing a shift in its effectiveness, as well as assessing the direction and intensity 
of such shift, parallelly to the forced passage from conventional to unconventional measures 
of monetary policy. The stress on the bank lending channel underscores the crucial role of 
credit institutions in transmitting monetary decisions on the real economy, which would be 
felt differently by various countries according to the extent of banks’ liquidity, size and 
strength (as derived from some balance sheet items). The choice to rely on banks for 
predicting the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism was also rooted in the preferred 
methodology of adopting micro-dataset made of banks’ balance sheet items to make inference 
on their lending activity, instead of employing approaches based on aggregate data, which 
might also reflect institutional or structural differences among states. 
Three main conclusions have been achieved through the comparative overview of the bank-
lending channels for conventional and unconventional monetary measures: 
1. An improved degree of uniformity across countries in the response of the relative 
credit institutions to unconventional monetary shocks has been detected, compared to 
traditional interest rate innovations. This first, more intuitional, outcome steams from 




originally outlined for the alignment of lending standards across European banks. 
Lending activity definitely proved to be less intense in its potency and but more 
homogeneously distributed across credit institutions located in EMU countries. The 
main divergencies in the lending channels for the two categories of measure relate to: 
different consequences on banks’ future capital position and profitability; implications 
of the holding of sovereign bonds; degree of information asymmetry between banks 
and investors; presence of capital or funding constraints; potency of the relative risk-
taking channel; Duration and persistence of the effects on the economy; 
2. With regard to the structural dimensions contributing to differently affect cross-
country heterogeneity, a number of banks’ balance sheet items have been studied. 
Those commonly considered, by practitioners and researchers, as the most influent 
ones, even if to differing extents, are those of liquidity, strength and size, which have 
been computed in a number of ways according to the available data. Without running 
regressions or empirical approaches, what can be predicted is a greater degree of 
uniformity in the influence such determinants have on lending activity, parallelly to 
the standardization of the banking sector which is one of the explicit objectives of 
unconventional monetary policy; 
3. Further empirical research would be needed to practically sustain such theoretical 
assessment. The most adequate methodology would be represented by the application 
of econometric techniques to datasets composed of banks’ balance sheet items, in 
order to better grasp their individual reactions, which, matched with institutional and 
structural country characteristics, might give an idea of the reduction of cross-country 
heterogeneity. A degree of complexity could then be added combining such results 
with an aggregate analysis on a group of Euro members in order to have a more 
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